Criminal intent constitutes a fundamental pillar in determining criminal liability. As for dolus eventualis (probable intent), some have argued that the law requires clear boundaries between intent and negligence, in a manner that ensures balance between the pursuit of justice and the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights. Accordingly, probable intent emerges as a form of criminal intent, though this concept raises both ethical and legal questions. At its core, understanding probable intent depends on a proper grasp of the elements of mens rea, which is subject to two main theories: the cognitive theory (perception) and the volitional theory (will). Thus, while the degree of foreseeability distinguishes probable intent from direct intent, it is the direction of the will that separates probable intent from fault (or negligence). To To distinguish probable intent from other forms of fault, criminal jurisprudence has developed two primary theories: the probability theory and the acceptance theory.
Aliwi et al. (Sun,) studied this question.
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