Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s: a minority faith

Andrew Wilson. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. xviii, 300 pp. Maps. Tables. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. 59. 95, cloth. 23. 95, paper. Andrew Wilson from the University of Cambridge is an expert on the post-Soviet era, specializing particularly in Ukraine. He has written extensively on various aspects of Ukrainian politics. His present volume's overriding argument is that the appeal of Ukrainian nationalism is severely limited by the country's inherited regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences. Before coming under Soviet rule, the regions of western Ukraine had been for many centuries part of various East-Central European states. Most notably Galicia, Transcarpathia, and northern Bukovyna had known neither Russian nor Soviet rule until World War II. During the interwar period Volhynia also remained outside Soviet borders. By contrast, other regions have been under very strong Russian influence. This is especially true of eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as the Crimea, which Russia acquired from the Tartars in the 18th century and which was settled by Ukrainians and Russians. As a result, there has developed a profound dichotomy between western Ukraine and the rest of the country. The dichotomy is clearly seen in the regional distribution of ethnic Russians. In no region of the western half of Ukraine, excluding Kyiv (i. e. , Kiev), the Russian minority exceeds 10 percent of the population. By contrast, in southern and eastern Ukraine ethnic Russians make up respectively 24 and 36 percent of the population, while in Crimea they dominate numerically with 67 percent. Even more telling is the regional distribution of Russophones. While in no western region, excluding Kyiv, Russian speakers exceed roughly one quarter of the population, in the remaining regions they are either in the numerical majority or at about par with Ukrainophones. Across the country, the nationalist movement followed differing paths of historical development. Outside of the western regions the mainstream Ukrainian nationalist movement tended as a rule to be more cautious and moderate, seeking autonomy within the Russian and later Soviet state rather than outright independence. This approach was the corollary of a low level of national consciousness among the masses of local Ukrainians, and of the strong Russian control of, and influence in, the area. By contrast, Ukrainians of liberal Austrian Galicia achieved a high level of national consciousness and built the foundations of a bold and vigorous national movement. Subsequently, in interwar Poland, Galician and Volhynian Ukrainians developed two nationalist traditions. On the one hand, the Ukrainian national-- democratic party was strongly represented in parliament; on the other, a very influential underground terrorist network, the OUN, was created. The latter, along with its military wing, the UPA, led the nationalist movement in the region during World War II and its aftermath. Though eventually stifled by the Soviets, west Ukrainian nationalism was never completely uprooted, and many a dissident in Soviet Ukraine hailed from that region. Thus, various nationalist traditions were created in the country, resulting in a considerable diversity of Ukrainian nationalist political parties active in the 1990s. They can be divided into two groups: national-democratic and ultra-nationalist. The most popular nationalist party was Rukh, a national-democratic front. The other two important national-democratic parties were the Ukrainian Republican Party and the Democratic Party of Ukraine. Ultra-nationalist parties tended to be smaller but more numerous. Emigre veterans of the OUN were influential in establishing the most popular among them, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. The second in importance was the Ukrainian National Assembly with its paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian Self-Defence Force. …