Autistic injustice as affective injustice: the double empathy problem is not about empathy

In this paper, I argue that autistic individuals experience a specific kind of injustice: autistic injustice. I will argue that this form of injustice is closely tied to emotional norms, which are the standards dictating, for instance, how emotions should be expressed appropriately and which emotions are deemed suitable in particular contexts. I will build on Damian Milton's (2012) concept of the "Double Empathy Problem," which challenges the traditional view that autistic people lack empathy. However, I propose that Milton's focus on individual psychology could complement a structural account that centers on emotional norms. My argument is that these emotional norms, which govern most of our social interactions, are predominantly designed to meet neurotypical needs and expectations, often disregarding the needs and preferences of autistic individuals. This, I argue, constitutes an affective injustice.