January 1, 1982

Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release

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Abstract

This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly environment.

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Novshek et al. (Fri,) studied this question.

www.synapsesocial.com/papers/6a12683b1292a1e50c34da24 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3003442

Authors

William Novshek

Hugo Sonnenschein

Journals

The Bell Journal of Economics

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Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release

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Abstract

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Discussion

Cite this study

Authors

Journals

Actions

References and Citations

Citation Network

Connected Papers

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