Quantum tagging for tags containing secret classical data

Various authors have considered schemes for quantum tagging, that is, authenticating the classical location of a classical tagging device by sending and receiving quantum signals from suitably located distant sites, in an environment controlled by an adversary whose quantum information processing and transmitting power is potentially unbounded. All of the schemes proposed elsewhere in the literature assume that the adversary is able to inspect the interior of the tagging device. All of these schemes have been shown to be breakable if the adversary has unbounded predistributed entanglement. We consider here the case in which the tagging device contains a finite key string shared with distant sites but kept secret from the adversary, and show this allows the location of the tagging device to be authenticated securely and indefinitely. Our protocol relies on quantum key distribution between the tagging device and at least one distant site, and demonstrates a new practical application of quantum key distribution. It also illustrates that the attainable security in position-based cryptography can depend crucially on apparently subtle details in the security scenario considered.