Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings

Although we are surprised that Abramowitz and Saunders continue to advance arguments that we have rebutted in other publications, we are grateful to the Journal for providing another opportunity to address some misconceptions in the study of popular polarization. We will reply point-by-point to the Abramowitz and Saunders critique, but given that our responses have been elaborated at length elsewhere, we refer interested readers to these sources for more detailed discussions.1 Before proceeding, we emphasize one observation that partially vitiates several of the Abramowitz and Saunders criticisms. Much of the data they view as contradicting our conclusions consists of vote reports, election returns and approval ratings. These variables obviously are of paramount political concern, but they can not be used as evidence of polarization—for or against. As explained in Culture War? centrist voters can register polarized choices, and even if the beliefs and positions of voters remain constant, their voting decisions and political evaluations will appear more polarized when the positions candidates adopt and the actions elected officials take become more extreme.2 When statistical relationships change, students of voting behavior have a