Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle

T HE problem of the Cartesian Circle is sometimes treated as though it were merely an exercise for scholars: Descartes fell into it, and theirjob is to get him out of it. But more is at stake than extricating Descartes. In its generalized form, the Cartesian Circle is none other than the Problem of the Criterion, a problem that any epistemology must face. Moreover, to solve the problem of the Circle one must answer questions about epistemic principles that are pivotal in contemporary debates between foundationalists and coherentists. There is reason to hope, therefore, that by examining Descartes's problem we can throw light on problems of our own. This paper is divided into two parts. In Part One I examine solutions to the problem of the Circle that are possible within Descartes's own framework. In Part Two I show how what we learn in Part One may be used to resolve some contemporary disputes that hinge on the status of epistemic principles.