An Empirical Study of Military-Industrial Linkages

Military-industrial relations are examined from both the elistist and pluralist perspective on power. Neither theory readily accounts for all of the empirical data. On the one hand, elist theory explains the relatively high level of military spending after World War II as well as the deep dependence on military expenditures among some large corporations. However, both the regresion and input-output analyses indicate that the economy does not require extensive military outlays. Indeed, there is some evidence that most corporations would be more prosperous if the government shifted to nonmilitary expenditures. These discrepancies suggest that a third interpretation may be in order. Based on the assumption that a growing division of labor leads to increasingly specialized needs and vested interests, the hypothesis of compensating strategies is presented. Under this notion, political decision that run counter to the interests of the majority will occur even if the government is not dominated by a small number of elite interest groups. Rather, such a pattern may result from a process in which the diverse interest groups seek to maximize their net gains. This alternative perspective is illustrated by the composition of Senate committees.