IsSvasavittiTranscendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Ś ntarak ita

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes This paper was fostered partly by an exchange of scholarly work and correspondence with Jay Garfield and Charles Goodman, whom I thank for the stimulation. (Cf. Garfield, 2004 Garfield JL 2004 The conventional status of reflexive awareness: What's at stake in a Tibetan debate? Unpublished manuscript Google Scholar; Goodman, 2004 Goodman C 2004 Has Strawson refuted Dharmakrti? Paper presented at the Eastern Division conference of the American Philosophical Association December Google Scholar.) Thanks also to Rick Nance and Rajam Raghunathan for their comments on an earlier draft. Also referred to as svasa vedana (from the same verbal root). Williams's study (1998 Wayman, A. 1979. Yogcra and the Buddhist logicians. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2(1): 65–78. Google Scholar) then concerns the question—much debated among Tibetan interpreters of Indian Madhyamaka—of whether or not these M dhyamika critiques were meant to show that svasa vitti is (not only not ultimately, but) not even conventionally valid. See also the review article by Kapstein (2000 Kapstein M 2000 We are all Gzhan stong pas: Reflections on The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence, by Paul Williams Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7 105 125 (http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/7/kapstein001.html) Google Scholar). Or we might instead (with important implications) say sapient (cf. Brandom, 2000 Brandom R 2000 Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialism Cambridge MA Harvard University Press Crossref , Google Scholar, p. 2, et passim). That is, if the 'intentionality' picked on this understanding of svasa vitti is understood as a particularly semantic phenomenon—as the kind of 'aboutness' that is particularly displayed in judgments—then we are talking about the distinguishing characteristic of a particularly conceptual sort of awareness. This would, of course, undermine the view (surely held by Dign ga) that svasa vitti is to be reckoned a kind of perception (hence, as non-conceptual)—though as I will suggest in concluding, such a view might be philosophically preferable. Williams (1998 Williams P 1998 The reflexive nature of awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka defence London Curzon Google Scholar, pp. 19–35); cf. Blumenthal (2004 Blumenthal J 2004 The ornament of the Middle Way: A study of the Madhyamaka thought of Śntarakita Ithaca NY Snow Lion Google Scholar, pp. 220–227). This point cannot, perhaps, be held against Candrak rti, who had only Dign ga in his sights. It may, though, count against Ś ntideva—or at least against his commentator Prajñ karamati, who specifically addresses Ś ntarak ita's understanding of svasa vitti, and tries to show that it does not escape the M dhyamika critique. Cf. note 70, below. For these different terms, see Critique of Pure Reason, A108 ('transcendental unity of apperception'), B132 ('pure' or 'original apperception'), B157 ('synthetic original unity of apperception'). This and the preceding quote from Hume are from his Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Section VI (Hume, 1978 Hume D 1978 A treatise of human nature L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed., with an Analytical Index). (2nd ed., with text revised and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch) Oxford Clarendon Press (Original work published 1739.) Google Scholar, pp. 252, 255, respectively); the emphasis is mine. In that case, Kant's would be a basically Cartesian argument—though as we will note, he clearly meant to emphasize that he did not intend for it to be read thus. That is, 'intuition' (or 'perception') involves (to invoke McDowell's phrase again) simply causally efficacious 'impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities'. That is, the 'synthesis' of manifold intuitions represents, for Kant, the point at which deliberative freedom becomes possible—with its arguably being the whole point of his entire project to explain how freedom is possible in a scientifically describable world. It is in this way that Kant characteristically contrasts 'receptivity' (the mode of 'intuition') and 'spontaneity' (the mode of 'thought', 'understanding', or 'judgment'). Specifically, there is an equivocation between 'I' as grammatical subject ('I think'), and 'I' as naming an ontologically distinct substance ('therefore I am'). Cf. A344, ff. where Kant emphasizes that 'since the proposition "I think" (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of the understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding' (A348). Husserl similarly argues that Descartes's argument is problematic precisely insofar as he compromises its essentially transcendental character—specifically, by introducing 'the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans … and the point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality…' (1995, p. 24). B157. Cf., A117n: '… it must not be forgotten that the bare representation "I" in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty.' In this and the preceding passage, Kant makes, inter alia, a point that would decisively cut particularly against Dign ga's characteristically foundationalist deployment of svasa vitti. Thus, we will see that for Dign ga, the point in characterizing svasa vitti as a species of 'perception' (pratyak a) is to say that the acquaintance we have with our own mental states is constitutively immediate (that is, non-conceptual, non-discursive). Kant urges precisely the opposite in thus arguing that the content of the transcendental unity of apperception is 'a thought, not an intuition', and that whether it is clear or obscure is of no importance. Kant's point finds expression in the 20th century in the work of Wilfrid Sellars, whose influential critique of the 'myth of the given' (1963, pp. 127–196) develops the point that even our acquaintance with our own mental states necessarily presupposes mastery of some concepts, etc. More on this point when we turn to Dign ga. Cf. Brandom's comment that the course of philosophy changed significantly with the 'replacement of concern with Cartesian certainty by concern with Kantian necessity' (2000, p. 80; cf. pp. 163–164)—that is, with the replacement of a subjectively epistemic desideratum ('certainty') by an arguably objective one. And in fact, Kant's doctrine is arguably the precursor to the idea of intentionality as that is developed by thinkers as diverse as Brentano and Husserl, Sellars and Brandom. Indeed, this is as it must be if language is to be possible at all. Among other things, this greatly complicates our picture of causally efficacious 'svalak a as' as what precipitates perceptual cognitions; for it is difficult to retain the view that perceptual cognitions alone are causally explicable if svalak a as are really something like 'sense-data'—given which, the grounds for distinguishing these from inferential cognitions become less obvious. Consider, in this regard, Sara McClintock's (2003 McClintock S 2003 The role of the 'given' in the classification of Śntarakita and Kamalaśla as Svtantrika-Mdhyamikas. In G. Dreyfus rather, it is rooted in karmic imprints and ignorance.' But of course, moments of inferential awareness presumably could similarly be described as caused by 'an imprint for the arisal' of such—in which case, perception would seem to lose its distinctive status. The Sanskrit (as given in Hattori, 1968 Hattori M 1968 Dignga, on perception, being the Pratyak apariccheda of Dignga's Pram asamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions Cambridge MA Harvard University Press Google Scholar, note 1.55, p. 97) is: savy p raprat tatv t pram a phalam eva sat. Tibetan at ibid., p. 183: 'di la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bzhin du tshad ma las 'bras bu don gzhan du gyur ba ni med kyi, 'bras bur gyur ba'i shes pa de nyid yul gyi rnam pa can du skyes pa dang, bya ba dang bcas par rtog pa de nye bar blangs nas, tshad ma nyid du 'dogs pa ste, bya ba med par yang yin no. My translation is adapted from that of Hattori (ibid., p. 28). Indeed, as Dign ga argues in his lambanapar k , cognition must be explicable without reference to any external objects, must be taken to have other mental events as its direct objects; for (as he argues there) any account of external objects necessarily presupposes some version of minimal part atomism, which Dign ga argues cannot coherently be adduced to explain our cognition of macro-objects. Tibetan at Hattori, op. cit., p. 183: yul gyi snang ba nyid de 'di'i / tshad ma … ; cf. Hattori's translation, p. 29. Dharmak rti makes the same point at Ny yabindu 1.20: arthas r pyam asya pram am (Malvania, 1971 Malvania D (Ed.) 1971 Pa ita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradpa (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 11 (2nd ed.) Patna Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute Google Scholar, p. 81). Tibetan at Hattori, op. cit., p. 183: de ltar rnam pa du ma rig pa'i shes pa nye bar blangs pa de lta de ltar tshad ma dang gzhal bya nyid du nye bar 'dogs pa yin te … ; here, the translation is that of Hattori, ibid., p. 29 (though I have rendered the Tibetan equivalent of upacaryate as 'figuratively' rather than, with Hattori, 'metaphorically'). Pram asamuccaya 1.10. The Sanskrit (per Hattori, ibid., note 1.67, p. 107) is: yad bh sa prameya tat pram aphalate puna / gr hak k rasa vitt trayam n ta p thak k tam; cf., Hattori's translation, ibid., p. 29. Tibetan at Hattori, ibid., p. 183: shes pa ni gnyis su snang bar skyes te, rang gi snang ba dang yul gyi snang ba'o. snang ba de gnyis la gang rang rig pa de ni 'bras bur 'gyur ro; cf. Hattori's translation, ibid., p. 28. Cf. note 18, above. At Pram asamuccaya 1.1. Hayes (1988 Hayes RP 1988 Dignga on the interpretation of signs Studies in Classical India 9 Dordrecht Kluwer Google Scholar, p. 136). Brentano (1973 Brentano F 1973 Psychology from an empirical standpoint (O. Kraus, Ed.; A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, it is really the only perception in the strict sense of the word … for the phenomena of the so-called external perception cannot be proved true and real even by means of indirect demonstration. For this reason, anyone who in good faith has taken them for what they seem to be is being misled by the manner in which the phenomena are connected. Therefore, strictly speaking, so-called external perception is not perception. Mental phenomena, therefore, may be described as the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible.' As much is conceded by Mok karagupta, who anticipates an objection to this effect: 'But if all cognitions are instances of the kind of perception that is apperception, then how would conceptual cognitions like "this is a jar" not be non-conceptual, and how would the mistaken cognition of a yellow conch shell not be non-erroneous? We reply: even conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with respect to itself; such cognition conceptualizes the external object with propositions like "this is a jar", but it does not conceptualize itself.' (Singh (1985 Singh BN (Ed.) 1985 Bauddha-Tarkabh of Mok karagupta Varanasi Asha Prakashan Google Scholar, p. 24): nanu sarvajñ n n svasa vedanapratyak atve gha o 'yam ity divikalpajñ nasya nirvikalpakatva , p taśa kh dijñ nasya-abhr ntatva ca katham na bhavet? ucyate: vikalpajñ nam api sv tmani nirvikalpam eva / gha o 'yam ity anena b hyam eva-artha vikalpayati, na tv tm nam.) This conclusion surely follows from Dign ga's initial contention that our various cognitive instruments (pram a) are only 'figuratively' so called, insofar as there is finally only the fact of occurrent cognitions having various phenomenological aspects. It is helpful, in understanding Dign ga's argument, to remain mindful of what is finally at stake for him—to remain mindful, that is, of the basically Buddhist point (viz. an tmav da) that is ultimately advanced by this epistemology; thus, Dign ga's is the view that what is finally warranted by the kind of cognition that is uniquely in contact with really existent phenomena is only the conclusion that there are sensations—which does not also warrant the inferential belief that these must be the states of a 'self '. This seems to be the view of Hattori; cf. inter alia, his notes1.65, 1.67 (p. 107). Alex Wayman has long opposed the 'idealist' reading of this and cognate schools. In an article specifically addressing the relations between Dign ga and the Yog c ra school, for example, Wayman writes: '… if indeed the Yog c ra school denies the reality of an external object, it would hardly be possible to find its position attractive to the Buddhist logicians who were to follow, since Dign ga and his successors … do not deny an external object; rather they call it a svalak a a (the "particular") and even sometimes describe it as param rtha-sat ("absolute existence"), to underscore the reality of this object of direct perception (pratyak a)' (1979, p. 65). It should be clear, though, that none of these points self-evidently counts in favor of Wayman's conclusions; for being 'absolutely existent' and uniquely 'particular' can just as well describe sensations as external objects. Here, my terms are those of Pram asamuccaya 1.10; cf., note 23, above. And this claim, of course, is neutral with respect to the question of what might finally exist in the world. This is the question that, I have noted, Mok karagupta tried to address (cf., note 28, above)—though it seems that Mok karagupta's expression simply states what the problem is, rather than resolving the tension; for the concession that 'even conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with respect to itself ' does not make clear what is gained by identifying that fact. Consider, in this regard, Frege's notion of 'objectivity' as consisting only in the kind of intersubjective availability that is a hallmark of language, which thus stands in contrast to the eminently private and subjective status of 'representations'. 'It is in this way', Frege therefore said, 'that I understand objective to mean what is independent of our sensation, intuition and imagination, and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations, but not what is independent of reason; for to undertake to say what things are like independent of reason, would be as much as to judge without judging, or to wash the fur without wetting it' (Frege, 1959 Frege G 1959 The foundations of arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number (J. L. Austin, Trans.) (2nd rev. ed.) Oxford Blackwell Google Scholar, sect. 26). Cf. Wolfgang Carl's characterization (1994 Carl W 1994 Frege's theory of sense and reference: Its origins and scope Cambridge Cambridge University Press Crossref , Google Scholar, pp. 192–193) of Frege's critique of the empiricist version of 'psychologism': 'If empirical knowledge includes or is even based on perceptual knowledge and if sense perception requires sensations, then there can be no empirical knowledge without something subjective … . Thus, Frege considers the judgment component of empirical knowledge as the real source or manifestation of its objectivity.' On the former (idealist) reading, this is because if any cognition, in order to count as such, must have separable 'subjective' and 'objective' aspects, then either one of these aspects, as a separable component of cognition, can be thought itself to have two such aspects; in the latter (representationalist) case, this is (more straightforwardly) because if, say, a conceptual thought counts as a cognition only in virtue of one's non-conceptual awareness of the fact of having it, then it can be thought that the latter awareness, in order to count as such, must itself be the object of a further such awareness. I have developed my understanding of Candrak rti's critique of Dign ga at length in Arnold (forthcoming, chs 6–7). That is, that they are not the of of any in either case, we would be with something that is where Dign ga's project requires that sense data be (as the only existent' Cf. in to Arnold Arnold (2003 D. on Dignga Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, pp. Google Scholar). Candrak rti had just that only a svalak a a that is understood as an object could be As his with Dign ga, Candrak rti then argues that this cannot be with of the as by the expression a a Candrak rti would read as 'the characteristic of This reference to a clearly sort of svalak a a then requires that Dign ga must his are to that svalak a a might also be understood as the of this This that there are two of svalak a is because of an one thus out as what is and one is not one by which something is svalak a a prameya ity eva the is then to count as it must at the same be an object, and an is what svasa vitti has here to Cf. de (Ed.) de la de Google p. The reference is to ra de (Ed.) par [Google pp. that Candrak rti is here arguing from the view according to which the verbal a is to be as an The claim, that a svalak a a is is to be understood as the that it is the object this (the that it therefore requires some of this de (Ed.) de la de [Google pp. svasa svasa t eva a svasa svalak a a p. svalak a a api svasa na api n ma na svalak a bh a t n svasa vitti Candrak rti the same image in the cf. de (Ed.) par [Google pp. de (Ed.) de la de [Google pp. , yad eva t , yad eva , tat ca n ma r na . a eva na eva . p. eva n svasa t More the possibility being is that of there being any whose subject and object are Consider, the conclusion of Candrak rti's critique as that is developed in the ' Thus, if svasa vitti then who the object, and the not to that cognition itself.' de (Ed.) par Google p. rang rig pa ma yin na / kyi gzhan gang par 'gyur / las dang bya ba / de nyid de par ma yin As in this Candrak rti's critique in the ra is particularly against the characteristically Yog c ra doctrine of the the that Yog c ra doctrine that the alone is really that the nature simply in the without the fact of its being distinct from one's subjective rti to 'If the as of subject and object, then who is of its de (Ed.) par [Google p. te med pa nyid / gnyis stong pa'i gzhan na / 'di par gang shes par 'gyur This is, I basically a question of the same form as the one that could be to Dign ga if his account of svasa vitti is read as a statement of cf. note above. The that Candrak rti's critique in the ra that is not in the is a of the argument for svasa vitti to Kant's argument Hume in the of the See the bh on ra de (Ed.) par [Google p. Candrak rti's conclusion is that this argument is is taken as the of at the same is as the of reflexive awareness. The argument is and therefore from The of An introduction to Indian University of Press [Google Scholar, p. note On as having significantly revised the of Dharmak rti, see Dreyfus Dreyfus G philosophy and its Tibetan interpreters NY University of Google Scholar, pp. That is, in order for a pram a to count as human is how Dharmak rti pram a at Ny yabindu it must (as I would be as the object of some some ('I This is, among the points of Kant's contention that 'It must be possible for the "I think" to all my It is to this that p. can that cannot be by at all have no to being or other point, is that mental not by have no to being pram Here, I am Dharmak rti's of to precisely what it is that 'perception' (pratyak a) is cf. Ny yabindu (Malvania, 1971 Malvania D (Ed.) 1971 Pa ita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradpa (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 11 (2nd ed.) Patna Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute Google Scholar, p. is a thought whose is for with The for with I be taken as basically with the