Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation

The literature on power dispersion in the regulatory state emphasizes the interdependence of regulatory agencies. However, this may conflict with their independence and specialization. Given this potential conflict, what provisions exist to facilitate co-ordination? And do these reflect national administrative traditions? This study explores these questions in the context of the formalization of co-ordination in economic regulation. First, we develop a new analytical framework for the analysis of co-ordination. Second, we set out how national administrative traditions may affect the formalization of co-ordination. Third, we explore the variation in co-ordination by analysing the formal relations among regulators in four countries with distinct administrative traditions – Germany, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK). Our findings suggest that the variation may at least partially be traced back to the independence of agencies. They also stress the importance of competition authorities as focal organizations in shaping relations in the area of economic regulation.