January 1, 1988

Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger

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Abstract

The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri ...

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Horn et al. (Fri,) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a06d24c02b4a6d6a3d3c9f5 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2555664

Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

1Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model1982 · 5,362 citations
2Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries1988 · 228 citations
3Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation1988 · 267 citations
4The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling1986 · 2,271 citations
5Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements1985 · 2,595 citations

Discussion

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The RAND Journal of Economics

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Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger

Key Points

Abstract

Citation Network

Connected Papers

Cite This Study

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Discussion

Journals

References and Citations

Also Consider