On the Trace of Emmanuel Levinas

In her remarkable book Emmanuel Levinas: Problem of Ethical Metaphysics, Edith Wyschogrod clearly stressed contribution of Levinas to philosophy, defining it as a in relationships between ethics and metaphysics. She writes, The thought of Emmanuel Levinas is no less than an attempt to accomplish a radical reversal of traditional procedures by grounding metaphysics in ethics rather than in constructing an ethic upon pre-established metaphysical ' Wyschogrod's purpose, as she stated it herself, was mainly to evaluate feasibility of Levinas's effort to reconstruct metaphysics on ethical foundations. As we know, these ethical foundations can be summed up as altruism, a altruism as Wyschogrod said so well, that is grounded on transcendence of human face.2 Wyschogrod, through impressive and rigorous analyses, successively encounters problem of phenomenological method, break with Husserl, self, temporality, language, and Judaism in order to reach some enlightening conclusions that do not avoid problems and objections that could be raised about an ethical foundation of metaphysics. I will come back to some of these important objections later, but before examining these objections, I would like to begin by outlining my own approach to Levinas's philosophy. We can situate enterprise of Levinas in relation to larger movement that preceded him: namely, rebellion of singular and individual against claims of universal. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Bergson all have their place in movement. Each of these thinkers, in his own way, presents a recrimination against powers, both philosophical and practical, that are exercised by a despotic universality, a universality that institutionalizes itself in form of conceptual language, social devices, and laws of State. In a sense, whole of philosophy, especially since Aristotle, is put on trial by these thinkers. Aristotle wanted to make universal only path of science, and he insisted on common measure as means of social exchange and of law. In larger scheme, humans would live under reign of theoretical and practical universale that govern sociality, especially in form of concepts conveyed by language, and more generally in form of abstract - and alienating - laws, which reduce all things to anonymity and impersonality, erasing their singularity and leveling their differences into same neutralizing homogeneity. For some of these thinkers, Nietzsche for example, it is clearly specter of equality, democratic nightmare of a unified and uniform world where everyone is worthy of everyone, which disturbs. Nietzsche opposes to risk of the herd morality creation by individual of his own values and affirmation of individual perspective beyond all common measure and beyond all transcendent or established values. For others, like Henri Bergson, it is primarily limitations of science and philosophy when submitted to straitjacket of language, to common measure of pre-established concepts, which is targeted. For Bergson, general notions stored in language through process of socialization of truth do not permit one to grasp what is incomparable or incommensurable in individual intuition? It is necessary to free oneself from words, to go beyond constraints of language, in order to grasp things by an immediate intuition. For Bergson, intuition is this sympathy by which one carries oneself in interior of an object in order to coincide with what it has as unique and, by consequence, inexpressible.4 It is direct intuition, without any point of view or symbols, that enables us to reach absolute, and it is here, according to Bergson, path which must be chosen by philosopher. However, approach leaves untouched question of communicating to others direct intuition as experienced. …