Deterrence and power

ions may think of A as the Soviet nion, B as western Europe, C as non-Comunist Asia, and D as the Unit d Sta es.) oth A and D are th rmonuclear powers. hey are in a condition of nuclear sta ate, that is, neith r, by striking f rst at the ther, can prevent the ot r from striking ack with an eff ct outweighing any possible ains. We assume, therefore, that surprise ttack on D is not a ration l move for A, since is practically certain o retaliat . In the first llustration (Figs. 1 and 2), which e might al the massive m del, A has bstantial conve tio al ground forces, but has none. Both B and C are the objects of ontention between A and D, and they are (payoffs) and the probabilities he associates with each of D's possible responses to an attack. Figure 2 represents D's payoffs a d his estimate of the probability of attack. For convenience, we have made their valuations of gains and losses symmetrical. A e imates the probability of retaliation by D by attempting to guess D's payoffs. This probability, in theory, is determined by the size and direction of the gap between D's two ayoffs, as estimated by A.3 If A estimates D's payoffs to be roughly equal, logi-