The Role of Affect in Rational (Attributional) Approaches to Human Motivation

For a number of years I have been attempting to develop a general theory of human motivation in which cognitions, particularly causal attributions, play a central role (Weiner, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980). A great deal of space would be required to document all of the virtues and all of the shortcomings of this conceptual approach. Considering only the weaknesses (which I try not to do too often), in my mind what is most lacking is a systematic statement about the place of emotions given such a rational approach to human behavior. Bruner (1956) once accused George Kelly's personal construct theory of not being able to explain men in their most religious moments (Pg. 356). Such a goal is far beyond my aspirations, but I believe it is necessary to consider emotional life more closely and to ask how affect can be better incorporated within attribution theory and how causal beliefs and feelings are interrelated. It is already possible to begin to outline some of the roles of affect within an attributional perspective. In this paper I will document: (1) that emotions are responses to particular attributions; (2) that emotions, rather than causal ascriptions, are motivators of action; and (3) that affects can function as cues guiding self-perception. I also will argue that taking affect into account yields a different interpretation of successful achievement-change programs. In addition, an underlying theme throughout the entire paper concerns a continuing attempt on my part to clarify the differences between the two main perceived causes of success and failure, namely, ability and effort.