What question did this study set out to answer?

To evaluate the impact of preplay communication on coordination outcomes in bilateral coordination games.

May 1, 1992

Communication in Coordination Games

RCRussell CooperLiaoning University DDDoug DeJongMission Health RFRobert ForsytheRutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Puntos clave

To evaluate the impact of preplay communication on coordination outcomes in bilateral coordination games.
Conducted experiments on two types of coordination games with varying communication structures: one-way and two-way
Analyzed frequency of coordination outcomes based on communication formats
In cooperative strategy games, one-way communication increases the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to no communication
Two-way communication does not consistently reduce coordination failures
In non-risky strategy games, two-way communication always achieves the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, unlike one-way communication

Resumen

We present experimental evidence on nonbinding, preplay communication in bilateral coordination games. To evaluate the effect of "cheap talk, " we consider two communication structures (one-way and two-way communication) and two types of coordination games (one with a cooperative strategy and a second in which one strategy is less "risky"). In games with a cooperative strategy, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In the second type of game, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication does not.

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