Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 H Marquette and oecd, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, Paris: oecd dac, 2008. 4 R Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism', International Security, 22 (2), 1997, pp 54–89. 5 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars. 6 Z Scott, 'Literature review on statebuilding', Governance and J Hippler, 'Violent conflicts, conflict prevention and nation-building: terminology and political concepts', in Hippler (ed), Nation-building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? ', London: Pluto Press, 2004. 7 S Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. 8 A Leftwich, 'Politics in command: development studies and the rediscovery of social science', New Political Economy, 10 (4), 2005, pp 573–607. 9 For a discussion of how thinking on state failure and state building has developed in international relations, see N Lemay-Hébert, 'Trying to make sense of the contemporary debate on state-building: the legitimacy and the institutional approaches on state, state collapse and state-building', paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, Edinburgh, March 2010. 10 D Chandler, 'The security–development nexus and the rise of "anti-foreign policy"', Journal of International Relations and Development, 2007, 10 (4), pp 362–386. 11 A recent cross-department paper, bringing together the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (fco), Ministry of Defence (mod) and dfid, similarly reflects commitment to a more holistic approach. See fco, mod D Chandler, 'The EU and Southeastern Europe: the rise of post-liberal governance', Third World Quarterly, 31 (1), 2010, pp 69–85; E Newman, R Paris R MacGinty G Harrison, The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States, London: Routledge, 2004; and R Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism'. 14 Scott, 'Literature review on statebuilding'; U Hopp and A Etzioni, 'A self-restrained approach to nation-building by foreign powers', International Affairs, 80 (1), 2004, pp 1–17. 22 See R Paris, 'International peacebuilding and the "mission civilisatrice"', Review of International Studies, 28 (4), 2002, pp 637–656. 23 Scott, 'Literature review on statebuilding', p 5. 24 For more on the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, see http: //www. oecd. org/document/18/0, 3343, en₂649₃236398₃5401554₁₁₁₁, 00. html, accessed 25 July 2011. 25 Ibid. 26 Marquette and fco et al, 'Building stability overseas strategy', pp 11–14. 37 C Aoi, C de Coning & R Thakur (eds), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, New York: unu Press, 2007. 38 This may be the result of donor incentives and structures as well, and of what fits in a log frame and is 'measurable'. As Ferguson wrote, 'To "move the money" they have been charged with spending, "development" agencies prefer to opt for standardised "development" packages'. J Ferguson with L Lohmann, 'The anti-politics machine: "development" and bureaucratic power in Lesotho', The Ecologist, 24 (5), 1994, p 176. Although Ferguson wrote this almost 20 years ago, little has changed in terms of the imperative for donor agencies to 'move the money'. 39 Arguably this long-term investment and commitment has been driven more by geographical proximity (in the case of EU investment in the Balkans) or long-standing and quite personalised political relationships (UK in Sierra Leone). On the latter, see Jackson in this issue and for a critical perspective on EU–Balkans relations, see D Chandler, 'European Union statebuilding: securing the liberal peace through EU enlargement', Global Society, 2007, 21 (4), pp 593–607. 40 MS Grindle, 'Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries', Governance, 17 (4), 2004, pp 525–548. 41 We are not suggesting here that state building which reflects 'citizen preferences' is easily articulated or unproblematic. Different groups and constituencies of citizens will have different aims and agendas, and a citizen-led state building would not necessarily be compatible with other goals of the donors, particularly long-term peace and stability.
Marquette et al. (Tue,) studied this question.