Article of faith: The failure of royal liberalism in Thailand

Abstract Calls for "royal intervention" to end the political crisis that wracked Thailand in 2006 were consistent with the disposition of Thai liberalism. The apparent paradox of liberals seeking a seemingly extra-constitutional solution to end the popular rule of Thaksin Shinawatra's government stems from the agnosticism of liberalism to majoritarian democracy. The specific challenges that emerged as a consequence of Thaksin's rise led liberals to mobilise royalist ideas to withstand Thaksin's assault on the liberally conceived 1997 Constitution. Key among these ideas was the notion of sovereignty as expressed in the relationship between the monarch and the people, or rachaprachasamasai. The failure of "royal liberalism" to bring an end to the crisis, may signal a more general failure of royal liberalism to secure political order in the future. Key words: Thaksin ShinawatraliberalismdemocracyConstitutionSondhi LimthongkulDemocrat partymonarchy Acknowledgement Research for this article was supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant DP0664126. The author's thanks go to Kevin Hewison and Duncan McCargo for sound criticisms and suggestions for improvement. Notes 1 After April the movement was effectively demobilised and the focus moved to intra-elite conflict in the courts and the military. 2 There is no correct way of translating this term, although king-people-interdependency comes closest. I use "mutuality" to suggest something of the pacting nature inherent in the term. 3 Calls for a royally-appointed government were an intermittent feature of post-1997 politics. They assumed meaningful form, however, with the rise of the liberal anti-Thaksin movement. 4 Khamnun Sithisaman is a close associate of Sondhi, having worked as a senior editor at Manager. He was influential in circulating the idea of rachaprachasamasai (see Khamnun, Citation2005, where reference to Bowonsak and Kukrit is made – leading me to these sources). 5 The idea of rachaprachasamasai was taken up by extreme right-wing groups in the lead up to the coup of 1976 (Ukrist Pathamanand, pers. comm., July 16, 2007). 6 Article 7, in modified form, appeared in the post-coup constitutions of (year, followed by the article number): 1959/20; 1971/22; 1976/24; 1977/30 1991/30). Its usage in the 1997 Constitution differs from previous usages. While preceding usages refer only to "democracy," Article 7 refers to "democracy with the king as head of state," giving it a royal inflection. Previously, usages were positioned towards the end of the constitution. Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution occurs as the last article in Section One on general principles and immediately before Section Two on the monarchy. 7 At first the amendment was lost (30-29). A recount was requested and the amendment won 37-35 (CDA, Citation1997c: 133). 8 Later, of course, it would be used to discipline electoral majorities – a seemingly political liberal ruse on democracy. 9 The term "convention" is also used. 10 This is a contested, but largely operative legal principle. It is on that basis that Khamnun (Citation2005), for example, elaborating on the call for power to be returned to the king in 2005, argued that as Thaksin had effectively launched a coup d'état by virtue of his power and the constitution was now dead, power should be returned to the king. 11 Sondhi's compromised past as an associate of Thaksin (see Hewison, Citation2008; Ukrist, Citation2008) and his mobilisation of a mass movement meant that key leaders of the liberal "network monarchy" (McCargo, Citation2005: 511), which pushed forward political reform in the 1990s, were suspicious of his agenda and remained distant. 12 Rules stipulated that the Senate accept or reject only the successful SAC nominee, not select from the pool of nominees. The SAC originally forwarded its successful nominee to the Senate, but the Senate requested all three SAC nominee names be forwarded. It then selected Jaruvan, even though she was not the SAC choice. 13 Thaksin's relationship with Sanoh's faction was complicated. Initially, Thaksin required its numbers in parliament to ensure he was not subject to a censure motion. As Thaksin's own parliamentary numbers increased, relations with Sanoh broke down, but Sanoh remained with TRT because had his faction defected and a snap election was called, the defectors risked not being able to stand in the new election as a consequence of a 90-day party membership rule. 14 Sanoh is reputed to have had close relations to Jaruvan, and appears to have used the auditor-general issue to advance his own political interests, as well as raise issues relating to Thaksin's overly aggrandising behaviour. Typically, before 2001, governments fell or were disciplined as coalition or factional partners pressured for their own interest. Thaksin's position was much stronger because of the 90-day rule. Sanoh remained within TRT in 2005 despite a break down in relations. The issue of royal powers became his chosen course of attack. 15 Within a few months several hundred thousand people had read the story on Manager's website. 16 The Bangkok Post (2 November 2005) reports those comments as: "The provinces which place their trust in us will be given special care … the provinces which trust us less will come in later." 17 The exact nature of this "sale" remains opaque and is at the heart of current investigations into Thaksin's alleged corruption. 18 The title of this source mistakenly dates the speech as occurring on 26 April. 19 PAD – without Sondhi and Chamlong – had first formed in 2004 in the wake of worker opposition to Thaksin's privatisation policy. According to Thanaphon (Citation2007: 298) it aimed at "knocking out Thaksin" by mobilising workers and the public. Thaksin's offer of welfare and shares to state enterprise workers helped fragment the worker-NGO alliance, and it fell into obscurity.