Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents

Democratic assemblies insert themselves into the policymaking process in one or more of three basic ways: originative, by making and breaking executives, who then shoulder most of the policymaking burden; proactive, by initiating and passing their own legislative proposals; and reactive, by amending and/or vetoing executive proposals. European parliaments are the primary examples of originative/reactive assemblies. The U.S. congress and the assemblies of the U.S. states are the primary examples of proactive/reactive assemblies. In Latin America, legislatures typically can not remove presidents they dislike and lack the resources to fashion their own legislative proposals. Thus, they are neither originative nor proactive; they are merely reactive. That Latin American legislatures are only reactive does not mean that they are dysfunctional. While Latin American presidents at times dominate the political process, at other times they make policy concessions as a part of their overall strategy to get their way. Even if one continues to view the president as the central actor in the civilian political universe, his anticipation of a (possible) legislative veto should in theory condition most of his actions. The optimal strategy for even the most autocratically minded president is not to pretend the legislature does not exist and propose whatever policies he likes, then react spasmodically when the legislature refuses its assent. Rather, the cheapest strategy will often be to cobble together as many legislative votes as possible purely on the merits, conserving other assets (such as pork and patronage) for securing any necessary marginal votes.