The Primacy of the Ingroup: The Interplay of Entitativity and Identification

In the present chapter, we move away from the traditional focus on the outgroup encountered in the literature on intergroup relations and argue that the ingroup is psychologically primary. We build upon the notion of entitativity first proposed by Campbell (1958) and suggest that entitative ingroups meet basic needs related to group membership better than less coherent ingroups. We provide initial support for the privileged status of entitative ingroups by reviewing contemporary research on group homogeneity. Next, we report on a research program showing that social identification and ingroup entitativity go hand in hand. First, we address the influence of ingroup identification on group entitativity in such phenomena as the “black sheep” effect and ingroup overexclusion. Second, we examine the impact of ingroup entitativity on social identification. We conclude by proposing that ingroup entitativity may also be related to a feeling of efficacy which need not produce conflict and discrimination toward outgroups. Globally, the accumulated evidence strongly suggests that the perception of ingroup entitativity plays a key role in intra- and intergroup relations. One's own family is an ingroup; and by definition all other families on the street are outgroups; but seldom d o they clash… One knows that one's lodge has distinctive characteristics that mark it off from all others, but one does not necessarily despise the others. The situation it seems can best be stated as follows: although we could not perceive our own ingroups excepting as they contrast to outgroups, still the ingroups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and sometimes, for them. Hostility toward outgroups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required (Allport, 1954, pp. 40–41).