Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Abstract King Gyanendra's takeover of absolute political power in February 2005 paved the way for the Maoists of Nepal and the political parties to fight together for democracy. In signing the 12-point agreement with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), the Maoists even changed their strategy from a revolutionary agenda to a democratic one. The paper argues that the Maoist departure from the classical resistance model to the path of negotiation was tactical, to overcome the constraints on their way forward. However, the SPA and the Maoists have several issues to settle for making the experiment a success. If this accord fails, Nepal might face a fresh round of conflict and the monarchy might get another chance to dominate the polity. Nihar Nayak is Associate Fellow at IDSA. Notes ∗Estimated on the basis of armed manpower strength. 1 Baburam Bhattarai, Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal, Utprerak Publications, Kathmandu, 1998. Also see, 'Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal', Human Rights Server, at http: //www. humanrights. de (Accessed October 26, 2006). 2 Biplab Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement, Allied, Bombay, 1974, p. 7. The concept Revisionists or Reformists was used by the ultra-Leftists in 1967 against those who were taking part in the state government under a bourgeoisie constitution and failed to adhere to the Maoist ideology. Also see the exclusive interview with CPI-Maoist spokesperson Azad (pseudo name) on developments in Nepal, in People's March (July 2006), a publication which reports on the activities of the Indian Maoists. Sidharth Varadarajan Part of the interview was published as 'Indian Maoists Criticise Prachanda', The Hindu, July 24, 2006. 3 'New Democracy' in communist ideology marks the transition from the classical Marxist stages of bourgeois hegemony (old democracy or any existing non-communist political system) to proletarian hegemony, followed by Socialism and finally setting up of a Communist Republic. For details, see the CPN-M profile in South Asia Terrorism Portal at http: //www. satp. org. 4 Abi Narayan Chamlagi, 'Maoist Insurgency: An Ideological Diagnosis', in Lok Raj Baral (ed. ), Nepal: Facets of Insurgency, Adroit, New Delhi, 2006, p. 20. 5 Michel Hutt (ed. ), Himalayan 'People's War', Hurst and Co. , London, 2004, p. 8. 6 Baburam Bhattarai, 'The Royal Regression and the Question of Democratic Republic', in R. K. Vishwakarma (ed. ), People's Power in Nepal, Manak, Delhi, 2006, p. 31. 7 Ibid. 8 A World To Win, 'Building Red Power in Nepal', in R. K. Vishwakarma, no. 6, pp. 94–95. 9 King Birendra agreed to the formation of the interim government on April 19, 1990. The government was assigned to prepare the constitution and conduct free and fair elections. Although the constitution was promulgated, the demand for a republic came both from within and outside the interim government. Finally, undermining the demands, the interim government conducted general elections in 1991. 10 Mahendra Lawoti, 'Contentious Politics in Democratizing Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti (ed. ), Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal, Sage, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 28–29. 11 Ibid. 12 Padmaja Murthy, 'Understanding Nepal Maoists' Demands: Revisiting Events of 1990', Strategic Analysis, 27 (1), January-March 2003. 13 Chaitanya Subba, 'The Ethnic Dimension of the Maoist Conflict, Dreams and Designs of Liberation of Oppressed Nationalities', in Lok Raj Baral, no. 4, p. 31. 14 'One Year of People's War in Nepal: A Review', The Worker, 3, February 1997, at www. cpnm. org (Accessed September 13, 2007). 15 Abi Narayan Chamlagi, 'Maoist Insurgency: An Ideological Diagnosis', in Lok Raj Baral, no. 4, p. 14. 16 'Nepal Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, ' Crisis Group Asia Report, 104, October 27, 2005, p. 7. 17 Shining Path, established in the late 1960s by former university professor Abimael Guzman, tried to install a peasant revolutionary authority in Peru. The group took up arms in 1980, and its ranks once numbered in the thousands. The rebels won control of large areas of the countryside and struck repeatedly at targets in the capital, Lima. Guzman and most of the Central Committee of the Shining Path were captured, pulverising the movement. Nevertheless, the rebels retain a small number of sympathisers among the rural poor. For more details see Simon Strong, Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force, HarperCollins, 1992. 18 'Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World', Li Onesto interviews Comrade Prachanda, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Revolutionary Worker, 1043, February 20, 2000, at http: //rwor. org/a/v21/1040–049/1043/interv. htm (Accessed August 27, 2007). 19 In March 1984, delegates and observers of various Marxist-Leninist-Maoist organisations held the second international conference, adopted a Declaration, and formed the RIM. RIM helps revolutionaries advance their ideological and political level through the political magazine A World To Win and get acquainted with revolutionary developments taking place the world over. 20 It is also believed that some senior Maoist leaders from Nepal visited Peru in the 1990s. (Author's informal interview with a senior government official in Raipur, Chhattisgarh in April 2007. ) 21 'Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World', no. 18. 22 'The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists', International Crisis Group, November 28, 2005, p. 4. 23 'Internal Debate within the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) ', Monthly Review, July 2005, at www. monthlyreview. org. Baburam Bhattarai's interview was conducted by Tehelka and published in its issue of July 9, 2005. 24 'Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal', Third Plenum of the Central Committee of CPN-M in March 1995, at www. cpnm. org/worker/issue3/document. htm (Accessed September 13, 2007). 25 'One Year of People's War in Nepal', no. 14. 26 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, pp. 210–214. 27 'The People's War in Nepal: Taking the Strategic Offensive', A World to Win, at http: //www. awtw. org. Also see http: //www. cpnm. org, and R. K. Vishwakarma, no. 6. To know more on strategic offensive, see ibid. 28 Monte R. Bullard, United States Army, says that the political warfare system is an organisational attempt to solve deep-rooted, non-combatant military problems involving loyalty and civil military relations. 'Political Warfare in Vietnam', at https: //calldbp. leavenworth. army. mil (Accessed September 29, 2006). 29 Interview with Thomas A. Marks in September 2006. Marks is Professor of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism at the School for National Security Executive Education of the National Defense University in Washington, DC and author of Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam, London, 1996. 30 Thomas Marks, 'Insurgency in Nepal', Faultlines, 15, February 2004. 31 'Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the People's War', The Worker, 2, June 1996. 32 Sudheer Sharma, 'The Maoist Movement: An evolutionary perspective, ' in Michael Hutt (ed. ), Himalayan People's War, London: Hurst and Company, 2004, p. 53. 33 'Strategy and Tactics', no. 23. 34 Prachanda, 'War Policy of Nepalese New Democratic Revolution in the context of Historical Development', in Janadisha, 2004 at www. cpnm. org (Accessed September 12, 2006). 35 The Third Central Plenum decided the detailed politico-military policy and programmes of the three strategic phases of starting an armed struggle. See 'Strategy and Tactics', no. 23 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 The Worker, 3, February 1997. 39 The Worker, 2, June 1996, at http: //www. cpnm. org/worker/issue2/w2₁p. htm (Accessed September 12, 2006). 40 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, no. 25, p. 21. 41 Halvard Buhaug, The Geography of Armed Civil Conflict, Doctoral Thesis, NTNU, 2005, pp. 19–20. 42 Scott Gates, 'Recruitment and Allegiance: the Microfoundations of Rebellion', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 2002. 43 The Maoists claim that the Jan Adalat (JA) system dispenses ready and speedy justice. Other reports say that it also terrorises people. Anyone in the village can approach the JA in quest of justice. It deals with all kinds of cases like corruption, family disputes, matrimonial conflict, property disputes, dowry, drunkenness, rape, and molestation of women. 44 Dev Raj Dahal, 'Nepal: Changing Strategies of the People's War', Nepal Democracy, at http: //www. nepaldemocracy. org/conflictᵣesolution/KBNepal2005. pdf. (Accessed September 12, 2006). 45 David G. Wiencek, 'China Views the War on Terrorism in Nepal', China Brief, 2 (11), May 23, 2002, at http: //www. jamestown. org (Accessed September 14, 2006) 46 Bertil Lintner, 'Nepal's Maoists Prepare for Final Offensive', Asia Pacific Media Services Limited, at http: //www. asiapacificms. com/articles/nepalₘaoists/ (Accessed September 12, 2006). 47 Dev Raj Dahal, no. 42. Some important frontal organisations of the CPN-M are: All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary) —Women's Wing; All Nepal National Independent Students' Union (Revolutionary) —Student Wing; Akhil Bharatiya Nepal Ekta Samaj; Magarat National Liberation Front; Tamuwan National Liberation Front; Taruwan National Liberation Front; Tamang National Liberation Front; Thami National Liberation Front; Majhi National Liberation Front; Madhesi National Liberation Front; Newa Khala; Nepal Dalit Liberation Front; Karnali Regional Liberation Front; Young Communist League; All Nepal Trade Union Federation. 48 Ibid. 49 'Nepal's Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, ' International Crisis Group, 27 October 2005, p. 23. 50 'Nepal Maoists', no. 16, p. 23. 51 'The People's War in Nepal', no. 26. 52 Ibid. 53 Tetsuya Kataoka, 'Resitance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front', University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974. 54 'The People's War in Nepal', no. 26. 55 'Building Red Power in Nepal', no. 8, p. 99. 56 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, no. 25, p. 137. 57 Mobile warfare is a mixture of manoeuvre and attrition warfare. It attempts to defeat the enemy by incapacitating its decision-making through shock and disruption. 58 Urban uprising or insurrection is a Maoist strategy of mobilising the masses to put pressure on the opponents on a specific issue, supported by its frontal organisations and sympathisers. 59 Maoists characteristically attempt to win popular support and consolidate their power by mobilising the population in mass meetings, street demonstrations, parades and other gatherings. 60 'Strategy and Tactics', no. 23, p. 27. 61 'The People's War in Nepal', no. 26. 62 Ibid. CPN-M chief Prachanda in the same meeting added that despite the same theoretical premises developed by Mao Zedong, in the context of the 21st century, it was not possible to use them mechanically. 63 Editorial, The Worker, 9, February 2004, at http: //www. cpnm. org (Accessed September 12, 2006). 64 Bertil Lintner, no. 44. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Interview with Prachanda, The Kathmandu Post, February 7, 2006. The part of the interview was published in 'Nepal's Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists? , ' International Crisis Group, May 18, 2007, p. 2. 68 'Exclusive interview with CPI-Maoist spokesperson on Nepal Developments', People's March, August 6, 2006, at http: //www. peoplesmarch. wordpress. com (Accessed September 10, 2006). Also see Sidharth Varadarajan 'Indian Maoists Criticise Prachanda', The Hindu, July 24, 2006. 69 Dev Gurung, a senior leader of the CPN-M, said, 'We have seen that the seven party leaders are becoming prisoners of indecision. We are bound to become suspicious with this lingering tactics. ' in Maoist leaders coment lack of seriousness among seven parties', Nepal News, 29 September 2006. 70 Human Rights Watch, 19 (2), February 2007. 71 Sarita Giri, of the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), has commented thus. The Chitra Bahadur Ale-led People's Front Nepal, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party and the Rastriya Janashakti Party also have reservations on the interim constitution. 72 '400 Indian workers flee Nepal' Mumbai Mirror, September 5, 2006. 73 Bertil Lintner, no. 44. 74 Li Onesto 'Dispatches from the People's War in Nepal, ' London: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 5. Also see Deepak Thapa, 'Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists, ' in Michael Hutt (ed. ) "Himalayan People's War", London: Hurst and company, 2004, p. 41. 75 Shankar Sharan, 'Fallacies of Understanding', Dialogue, 4 (2), October-December 2002. 76 Ibid. 77 Prakash Singh, 'The Maoist Insurgency in India and Nepal', Dialogue, 4 (2), October-December 2002, pp. 51, 53. 78 (The Times of India 'LTTE, Naxal tryst on high seas), on June 27, 2004 reported that the Tamil Tigers regularly supply the Maoist guerrillas with guns and ammunitions. ' Union Minister of State for Home Sriprakash Jaiswal said in Mumbai on January 13, 2005, 'We have the information on (Pakistani) ISI directly or indirectly supporting the Naxalite and ULFA activities in the country' (Press Trust of India). The Tribune ('Home Secretary: ISI aiding Naxalites') reported on March 6, 2000, that Union Home Secretary Kamal Pande said the Centre had reports that ISI was extending support to Naxalite groups active in Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh but there was no evidence to back it. While it was known that Nepal was being used as a base by the ISI, it was not difficult to create a corridor through Bihar to the affected areas in Andhra Pradesh. The assistance could be in the form of money, arms and training, he said, and identified the People's War Group, the Maoist Communist Centre and CPI (ML-Liberation Front) as groups having links with the ISI. Also see statement of Union Minister of State for Home, Sriprakash Jaiswal, in the Lok Sabha on August 1, 2006 '52 terror camps in Pak' The Statesman, August 2, 2006 August 2, 2006.
Nihar R. Nayak (Sun,) studied this question.