The immigration policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states

After the 'oil boom' of October 1973, the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf had to deal with a complicated dilemma: what to do with the extremely vast revenues from oil export. It seems that they decided to invest in three major economic and social fields. The first was the development of infrastructure and power stations as well as governmental ministries and services. The second field was the development of the industrial and agricultural sectors. The authorities of the GCC countries realized that there were no guarantees for the continuation of high prices of oil and that they would have to diversify their economies in order to maintain long-term high levels of per capita income and GNP. The third field was the substantial improvement in the area of social services, including the health care and education systems as well as other social services. However, these projects required an extensive work force of a quality and quantity which could not be supplied by local sources. There were two main reasons for the shortage of the national work force in the GCC countries. The first was small national populations. In 1975, the total national populations of the GCC countries were estimated to be little more than 6 million. The largest national population was in Saudi Arabia - about 4. 6 million - and the smallest in Qatar, with only 60, 000 (see Table 1). The second reason was very low rates of labour force participation (due to high rates of natural increase): about 20-23 per cent;' as compared with 50 per cent, and even higher, among the developed countries. 2 These trends forced the GCC countries substantially to increase the number of their foreign workers. One of the distribution characteristics of proven oil reserves in the Arab world is that they are greatest in the countries with relatively small populations. As a result, those countries with the larger populations and the greatest need for additional work opportunities have little, if any, oil. 3 Since the beginning of the 1970s, the authorities of the labour-exporting countries realized the benefits that could be reaped from inter-Arab labour movement, with the main benefits deriving from the financial remittances transferred by workers to their home countries and the reduction of pressure for work opportunities. In 1989, the last year before the Gulf crisis, the total of workers' remittances sent from the rich Arab oil-producing countries to Egypt, Jordan and Yemen reached 5. 190