Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?

espected scholars of color have suggested (e.g., Stanfield, 1985, 1993a, 1994), even within the pages of this journal (J. A. Banks, 1993, 1995; Gordon, Miller, Moss, 1994), or paradigmatic issues in general (e.g., Bereiter, 1994; Delandshere Gage, 1989). If we were among those raising this race-oriented issue, we would wonder why our efforts to argue that the epistemologies of educational research were racially biased provoked virtually no response, particularly among those who author the quantitative and qualitative research methods textbooks we all typically use. We would certainly wonder whether our argument was ignored because it raised the disquieting issue of race, because it was thought to be a weak or irrelevant argument, or because the argument was simply not understood. Unfortunately, we might also wonder whether this was just one more incidence of Ellison's (1972) invisible man syndrome, of Whites ignoring racial issues and people of color. As researchers whose race is White and who have