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Abstract Despite assertions about the ubiquity of coalition behavior in politics, theories of coalition formation have not usually been tested on data pertaining to the legislative process. The paper explores advantages and shortcomings of existing coalition theory for studying law-making in a multi-party parliamentary democracy with highly cohesive parties, using Denmark as the test case. All passed government bills 1953–1970 are studied in terms of the size and composition of the winning coalitions and policy area of bills. In all cabinet periods a certain number of bills are passed by minimal majorities, but most are not, indicating that minimal majority behavior is not a principal strategy in law-making. However, the traditional left-right model of the Danish party system is very successful in accounting for the coalitions formed. Classification of bills into policy areas also shows considerable variation with respect to levels of conflict, with taxation as the most conflict-generating area. The findings suggest that if we are ultimately to understand the significance of coalition behavior in politics, it is imperative that we relax strict rationalistic behavior assumptions and concentrate efforts on developing ways for systematic study of the content and perceived consequences of decisions made by winning coalitions.
Erik Damgaard (Sun,) studied this question.