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Abstract What does it mean to say a state is angry? To answer this question, this paper theorizes a diplomacy of anger. Specifically, the diplomacy of anger involves a vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to a perceived violation. Although the diplomacy of anger threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations, it can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. What is more, the diplomacy of anger can also exercise a reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions of those that practice it. The diplomacy of anger thereby contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile, and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interactions. To examine the analytical purchase of this approach vis-à-vis standard accounts of coercive diplomacy, this paper looks in-depth at the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Allen Carlson, Chen Qi, Ja Ian Chong, Thomas Christensen, Taylor Fravel, Avery Goldstein, Steven Goldstein, Kristina Johnson, Alastair Iain Johnston, Scott Kastner, Andrew Kennedy, William Kirby, Michael McKoy, Jennifer Mitzen, Robert Ross, John Schuessler, Ronald Suny, Alan Wachman, Lisa Wedeen, Alex Wendt, Keren Yarhi-Milo, the participants of the Fairbank Center Director's Seminar at Harvard University and the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Workshop, and the editors and two anonymous reviewers at Security Studies for their advice and comments. The author would also like to thank the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Fellowship Program for its financial and institutional support. All mistakes and omissions are the fault of the author alone.
Todd H. Hall (Sat,) studied this question.