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This article reconsiders one of the most well-known and longstanding arguments in comparative social analysis: S.M. Lipset's thesis on the value differences between Canadians and Americans. Beginniiing with a substantive assessment of Lipset's argument, we outline some apparent inconsistencies and related problems in his formulation. We then draw on a range of comparable measures from recent national surveys in both countries and find v7irtually no empirical support for Lipset's thesis. Most results indicate either no significant national differences or else differences that are opposite to those indicated by Lipset's argument. The application of a multiple indicators model, with or without controls on other background variables, fails to alter these results. The article concludes with some speculations on reasons for the lack of support for Lipset's thesis in the contemporary period and with some suggestions about the inherent difficulties that are associated with origins explanations. More than two decades have passed since Seymour Martin Lipset first offered his interpretation of value differences in the English-speaking democracies (Lipset 1963a, 1963b, 1964, 1968). Lipset's research on this question originally examined four nations England, Australia, Canada, and the United States but his assessment of Canadian and American value differences has stimulated most subsequent analysis and discussion of the question (e.g., Clark 1975; Crawford Davis 1971; Hagan Horowitz 1973; Truman 1971). Lipset's central thesis is now well-known. Essentially, he argues that, despite having similar historical roots as colonies of England, the Canadian and American nations have developed from distinct foundations, which have led to different systems of in the two countries. The United States originated from a liberal democratic revolution, in which British domination was rejected and, along with it, a range of institutions designed to conserve monarchical rule, to maintain established elites, and to preserve the privileges of special interest groups. Canada, however, is said to have grown out of an opposite process, a counterrevolution in which the populace remained loyal to the British Crown, respectful of the existing hierarchies of authority within the English system, and only belatedly interested in the creation of an autonomous Canadian nation. Thus, even though both countries eventually evolved into democracies, Lipset contends that the predominant associated with democratic systems individualism, *We thank James Curtis, Richard Henshel, Kevin McQuillan, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. The order of authors is alphabetical. Direct all correspondence to: Doug Baer, Department of Sociology, University of Westem Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5C2. 0 The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, March 1990, 68(3):693-713 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.169 on Sat, 01 Oct 2016 06:04:04 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 694 / Social Forces 68:3, March 1990 equalitarianism, and universalism, in particular are less strongly held in than in the United States. Canada's democratic principles are alleged to be touched or tempered by what some observers refer to as toryism, a residue of collectivist, elitist and particularist tendencies carried over from Canada's closer and longer connection to Britain (cf. Horowitz 1966). Certain aspects of Lipset's analysis have been generally accepted by other researchers and in some cases were anticipated by writers working prior to or independently of him (see especially Hartz 1955; Horowitz 1966). This observation is particularly true with regard to his portrayal of the historical pattern of value differences between Canadians and Americans (cf. Archibald 1978:239-43; Horowitz 1973; Porter 1965:70-73, 1967; for a recent review, see Forbes 1987). However, other features of Lipset's thesis have been greeted with considerable criticism and skepticism, especially his claim that these historical differences continue to operate, even in the present day (e.g., Crawford Curtis 1971; Grabb 1979; Grabb Horowitz 1973; Truman 1971). Lipset has reviewed much of this commentary, as well as more recent evidence bearing on key aspects of his argument, and has proposed some revisions to his original formulation (Lipset 1985, 1986). Even so, Lipset's conclusions remain largely the same: Canada and the United States continue to differ considerably along most of the dimensions suggested in my previous (Lipset 1985:156). Overall, has been no consistent decline in the patterns of differences in behaviour and values (Lipset 1986:146). To outline more specifically what these alleged differences entail is not a straightforward task. The main problems stem from inconsistencies in Lipset's own characterization of national value differences. Sometimes these difficulties involve apparent contradictions between Lipset's earlier accounts and his most recent formulations. At other times, they stem from his shifting levels of analysis, when, for example, structural differences in the two societies or possible differences in the of the elites in both countries are assumed to correspond precisely to value differences between citizens in the two nations. Finally, Lipset appears at other times to rely on a selective and inconsistent reading of the available evidence in which data that are supportive of the thesis are mentioned but other data that are not supportive of the thesis are either interpreted differently or else placed in a different context. We proceed now to identify five of the more important of these problems. Problems in the Lipset Thesis THE QUESTION OF MORAL CONSERVATISM One of the recurring themes in Lipset's analysis is that Canadians are generally more conservative than Americans, more likely to adhere to traditional or codes of conduct in the face of pressures for change. In his early writings, at least, Lipset contends that there is greater conservatism' in than in the United States. He suggests that Canada's state-run religious institutions, especially the Anglican and Catholic Churches, have played a key role in this conservatism and cites as evidence Canada's lower divorce rates and more restrictive legislation controlling alcohol consumption (Lipset 1968:54-55). Even if we set aside the debatable aspects of this evidence it was the United States, not Canada, that enacted universal prohibition of alcohol consumption in the 1920s, for example Lipset's claim of greater moral conservatism in appears to be contradicted by his own subsequent writings. One illustration is his current view that Americans have a deeper sense of Protestant than Canadians (Lipset 1985:125), as evidenced by the more restrictive attitudes that Americans have concerning marriage, the family, and sexual This content downloaded from 207.46.13.169 on Sat, 01 Oct 2016 06:04:04 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Canadian and American Values / 695 freedom (Lipset 1986:126-28; cf. Grabb 1979; Grabb & Curtis 1988). This point is one which is not raised in his early work and which he has used to suggest greater individual and religious factionalism in the United States. Yet the apparent inconsistencies between his original assertions of Canadian moral conservatism and his current observations of American evangelical moralism are
Baer et al. (Thu,) studied this question.