The Practical Significance of Taste in Kant's Critique of Judgment : Love of Natural Beauty as a Mark of Moral Character

In ? 42 of Critique of Judgment, Kant expanature only because our experience of it (sometiates on relation between taste and morality how) contributes to our moral vocation. when he explains that we have an intellectual in natural beauty.' He insists that taking such an in natural beauty is always a I. THE INTELLECTUAL INTEREST IN NATURAL BEAUTY mark of a good soul (Kennzeichen einer guten Seele) and that if a person's capacity to feel Given Kant's well-known thesis that pure judgpleasure in contemplating beautiful in ments of taste are devoid of interest, his nature is habitual, this indicates that he or she claim that we do-and should-take any kind has a mental attunement favorable to moral of in beautiful should strike us as feeling (moralischen Gefihl glinstige Gemfithsurprising. To be precise, Kant has argued, in stimmung) (KU 5: 299; 165-166).2 Further, first moment of Analytic of BeautiKant declares that we do and in fact should ful, that aesthetic are disinterested require others to take a direct in in two distinct senses. In first place, no beautiful in nature, thereby suggesting that we can serve as determining ground or are in some sense obligated to cultivate taste basis for a judgment of taste because any such (KU 5: 302-303; 169).3 dependence would undercut both autonomy This paper attempts to analyze and assess this and purity of taste. In second place, Kant particular feature of Kant's account of pracinsists, in a note appended to former claim, tical significance of taste, namely, his theory that judgments of taste, of themselves, do not that an aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty even give rise to any interest (KU 5: 205n; is intimately connected with moral character.4 46).5 Having initially defined in Section I addresses very concept of an intelCritique of Judgment as the liking we connect lectual in beautiful in nature and with representation of an object's explains what is involved in loving natural (KU 5: 204; 45), Kant later remarks that all beauty in this particular way. Section II consists in pleasure in existence of attempts to determine why Kant thought that a an object (KU 5: 296; 163).6 The direct implidirect, intellectual in natural, but not cation of Kant's thesis that pure aesthetic judgartistic, beauty is a sign of a good soul. The conments of reflection are entirely disinterested, cluding section, Section III, explores one puzzle then, is that pleasure we feel in contemplatthis analysis raises, which is whether Kant ultiing beautiful (in art and nature) is in no way mately grants a merely instrumental value to connected with any concern we might have for natural beauty, insofar as he suggests that we existence of beautiful objects. This is precisely take pleasure in existence of beauty in Kant's point in noting that question of