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Abstract This article studies economic sanctions in their political context, from the point of view of the sanctioning powers. The point of departure here is the question: why does a nation in a given political situation select precisely economic sanctions and not one of the other theoretically possible modes of reaction (stretching from absolute passivity to the declaration of full war) ? The article is then based on two case studies: the decision made by the League of Nations to apply sanctions against Italy in 1935, and the decision of the British Govern ment to apply sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965. The League-decision is explained as the outcome of a set of fallacious, legalistic theories about how the international system functions. The decision of the British Government is interpreted as an 'escape' from a political cross-pressure situation. Finally, the contention is formulated that, for political reasons, the probability of successful sanctions is fairly low.
Fredrik Hoffmann (Thu,) studied this question.