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6 experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of varying distributions of success and failure on attributions of intellectual ability. In the 1st 4 experiments 5s confronted a stimulus person who solved 15 out of 30 problems in a random, descending, or ascending success pattern. In the 5th experiment only the descending and ascending patterns were compared. Contrary to prediction, the performer who showed improvement (ascending success) was not consistently judged to be more able than the performer with randomly spaced successes. The performer with a descending success rate, however, was consistently judged to he more intelligent and was expected to outperform those with either ascending or random patterns. Memory for past performance was uniformly distorted in favor of recalling more success for the descending performer and less success for the ascending and random performers. Neither this measure nor ratings of intelligence required, for their discriminating effects, that 5 himself solve the problems in parallel with the person being judged. In the final experiment S himself performed in an improving, deteriorating, or random but stable fashion, and was then asked to estimate his future performance. Under these circumstances, the ascending performer was more confident about his ability than the descending or random performer, reversing the picture of the 1st 5 experiments. The results were discussed in terms of the salience of early information in attributing ability and the role of social comparison processes. Heider's (1958) analysis of person perception has generated considerable interest in the attribution process or in the conditions under which various personal dispositions are inferred from observed acts. Recent theoretical extensions of Heider's work by Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) reflect this continuing interest. The number of empirical studies dealing with attribution is not large, and the bulk of these focus on such dispositions as motives, intentions, and attitudes. Ability dispositions have been almost entirely ignored in considering various attribution instances. The present series of studies does focus on inferences about ability drawn from observed performance. There are undoubtedly many conditions that affect the extent to which 1 This research was facilitated by National Science Foundation Grant G8857. The authors are indebted for comments and suggestions to Jack Brehm, Darwyn Linder, Roland Radloff, and John Thibaut. Catherine Bayes served as the experimenter in the first study and on film; she made a number of perceptive contributions to the planning of the first
JONES et al. (Sun,) studied this question.