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Abstract This article reassesses Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan in 1979, based on newly available archival materials, especially from the former USSR. The article argues that these Soviet documents show that the 1979 invasion reflected defensive rather than offensive objectives. Specifically, the USSR sought to restrain extremist elements of the Afghan communist party, who were undermining stability on the southern Soviet frontier. The findings of this article are at odds with with long-standing views that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a larger Soviet strategy aimed at threatening the Persian Gulf and other western interests. Acknowledgments The author thanks Bruce Kuniholm, Robert McMahon, and Sean Duffy for comments. Kuniholm and McMahon disagreed with the analysis at points, but the author nevertheless appreciates their comments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference "Hot Wars in the Cold War, " sponsored by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, Hamburg, May 2004, and will appear in German translation as David N. Gibbs, Die Hintergründe der Sowjetischen Invasion in Afghanistan, in Heisse Kriege im Kalten Krieg, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Müller, and Dierk Walter (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006). Notes 1The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), associated with the Woodrow Wilson International Center, in Washington, D. C. , can be accessed electronically at www. wilsoncenter. org/index. cfm? fuseaction=topics. home and Ford Citation1979. Afghanistan does not appear in the index of either memoir. 11U. S. National Security Council Citation1954a, 1149. The quotation is directly from the document, which paraphrases Dulles. 12See Goldman Citation1967, 122–23. See also U. S. Government agency name not indicated Citation1962. 13Quoted in U. S. Department of State Citation1958, 228. 14Paraphrased in U. S. Department of State Citation1962, 217. 15U. S. Department of State Citation1955, 171. 16U. S. Department of State Citation1961. 17U. S. Department of State Citation1962, 216. 18U. S. Government agency name not indicated Citation1962. 19Goldman Citation1967, 122–23. 20U. S. National Security Council Citation1954b, 1153. 23Kann Citation1973. 21U. S. Central Intelligence Agency Citation1973. Writing after the Soviet invasion, Henry Kissinger expressed suspicion about possible Soviet motives in the 1973 coup, but provides no evidence. See Kissinger Citation1982, 675. 22U. S. National Security Council Citation1973. 24U. S. Department of State Citation1973. 25Cordovez and Harrison Citation1995, 16. 26 Far Eastern Economic Review Citation1974; and Harrison Citation1979. 27Quoted in Dupree Citation1979, 50. 28Selig Harrison in Cordovez and Harrison Citation1995, 27. Quote from Morozov is directly from Cordovez and Harrison, who paraphrase the views of Morozov. 29Willerton Citation1986. 30Regarding the internal dynamics of the Saur Revolution, see Halliday Citation1978; Rais Citation1994; and Giustozzi Citation2000. 32Halliday Citation1980, 24. 31In retrospect, such reforms were clearly needed and, indeed, were long overdue. Shortly before the communist takeover, a research team from the International Labor Organization had advocated land reform. See Bhatty and Berouti Citation1980. See also Gibbs Citation1986. 33I analyzed the source of this popular support at length in Gibbs Citation1986. 34USSR Government, 13 May 1978. 35Ibid. , 13 October 1978. 36Ibid. , 17 March 1979. 37Ibid. 38Ibid. , 18 March 1979. 39Ibid. , 20 March 1979a. 40Both messages in ibid. , 14 April 1979. 41Ibid. , 24 May 1979. 42Ibid. , 20 July 1979. 43Ibid. , 21 July 1979. 44Ibid. , 25 August 1979. 45Ibid. , 20 March 1979b. 46Ibid. , 28 June 1979. 49Quoted in ibid. Regarding the Soviet hostility toward Amin during this period, see ibid. , 372–74. 47A cache of U. S. government documents was captured by Iranian students during the takeover of the U. S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979. A large portion of these documents—later published in full—pertained to U. S. relations with Afghanistan. This Iranian collection is analyzed at length in Gibbs Citation1987. 48Ibid. , 373. 50USSR Government, 15 September 1979. 51Ibid. 52Ibid. , 20 September 1979. 53Ibid. , 29 October 1979. 54U. S. Office of the President Citation1979. See also, Gates Citation1996, 146–47. 55See Brzezinski's interview in Brzezinski Citation1998. The original interview is in French; an English translation was published in Gibbs Citation2000, 241–42. The full text of the English translation also appears in digital form at www. gened. ari-zona. edu/dgibbs/brzezinskiᵢnterview. htm. 56Steve Coll argues this point. He claims that he has studied documents written by Brzezinski shortly after the Soviet invasion took place. These documents "show no hint" that Brzezinski welcomed the Soviet invasion, Coll declares. Accordingly he doubts the veracity of Brzezinski's recent boasts that he welcomed the Soviet invasion and wanted to increase its chances. The matter is further complicated, however, when one views Brzezinski's memoirs, written during the 1980s, in which Brzezinski does in fact express some retrospective satisfaction at the Soviet invasion. One hopes that future memoirs by other officials, combined with document declassification, will shed light on the issue of the motivation of U. S. officials in supplying aid to the mujahiddin. See Coll Citation2004, 581; and Brzezinski Citation1983, 429. 57 Economist Citation1980. Note that this quote is directly from the Economist, which paraphrases Pravda. See also Petrov Citation1980. 58 Izvestia, quoted in Klose Citation1980. 59USSR Government, 29 October 1979. 60Ibid. , December 1979. 61Lyakhovsky Citation1995. 62Kornienko Citation1994. This account also mentions Ustinov as a key figure in advocating for intervention, along with Andropov. It also claims that the KGB "exaggerated" the threat from Amin during the inter-party debates. The quotation in the text is directly from Kornienko, which paraphrases the opinions of Andropov and Ustinov. 63Lyakhovsky Citation1995. Lyakhovsky, too, notes that Ustinov worked with Andropov in advocating an invasion. The quotations are directly from Lyakhovsky, which paraphrases the opinions of Andropov and Ustinov. 64The invasion decision is described in Kornienko Citation1994. 65USSR Government, 10 April Citation1980. 66Klass Citation1988, 925–26. 67Quoted from Sciolino Citation1989. 68Kennan Citation1947. 69See, for example, Kennan Citation1982. 70Gaddis Citation1997. For contrary views, see Buzzanco Citation1999; Lester Citation1998; Cumings Citation1995, 121–22; and Leffler Citation1996. 71Cox Citation2003, 10.
David Ν. Gibbs (Wed,) studied this question.