Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect.

This article presents a theory of how different types of discrepancies between self-state representa-tions are related to different kinds of emotional vulnerabilities. One domain of the self (actual; ideal; ought) and one standpoint on the self (own; significant other) constitute each type of self-state representation. It is proposed that different types of self-discrepancies represent different types of negative psychological situations that are associated with different kinds of discomfort. Discrepan-cies between the actual/own self-state (i.e., the self-concept) and ideal self-stales (i.e., representations of an individuals beliefs about his or her own or a significant others hopes, wishes, or aspirations for the individual) signify the absence of positive outcomes, which is associated with dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness). In contrast, discrepancies between the ac-tual/own self-state and ought self-states (i.e., representations of an individuals beliefs about his or her own or a significant others beliefs about the individuals duties, responsibilities, or obligations) signify the presence of negative outcomes, which is associated with agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, threat, restlessness). Differences in both the relative magnitude and the accessibility of individu-als available types of self-discrepancies are predicted to be related to differences in the kinds of discomfort people are likely to experience. Correlational and experimental evidence supports the predictions of the model. Differences between serf-discrepancy theory and (a) other theories of in-compatible self-beliefs and (b) actual self negativity (e.g., low self-esteem) are discussed. The notion that people who hold conflicting or incompatible beliefs are likely to experience discomfort has had a long history in psychology. In social psychology, for example, various early theories proposed a relation between discomfort and specific kinds of inconsistency among a persons beliefs (e.g., Abelson