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Significance Humans usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. However, such second-order punishment is essential to maintain cooperation. The central authorities established in modern societies punish both free riders and tax evaders. This is a paradox: would individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment strive for an authority that does? We address this puzzle with a mathematical model and an economic experiment. When individuals can choose between authorities by migrating between different communities, we find a costly bias against second-order punishment. When subjects use a majority vote instead, they vote for an authority with second-order punishment. These findings also suggest that other pressing social dilemmas could be solved by democratic voting.
Hilbe et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
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