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Male and female subjects (n — 65) witnessed a staged theft in which either an expensive object (high seriousness) or an inexpensive object (low seriousness) was stolen, and subjects either had prior knowledge of the object's value or learned of its value only after the theft. When witnesses had prior knowledge of the object's value, accurate identification of the thief was more likely when the theft was of high rather than of low seriousness. When knowledge of the crime's seriousness was gained after the theft, seriousness did not affect identification accuracy. These results suggest that the effect of perceived seriousness on accuracy is mediated by processes that operate during rather than after the viewing interval, processes such as selective attention and encoding. The present study also found that certainty of choice in the identification task was unrelated to accuracy of choice. As students of legal testimony have long known, an eyewitness identification is often the most convincing and decisive source of evidence in a criminal court case (cf. Levine Wall, 1965). Jurors usually see little reason to distrust eyewitness testimony that is given under oath by individuals who have little to gain by falsifying their testimony. Consequently, jury verdicts can be influenced by eyewitness identifications, with obvious consequences for someone accused of a criminal act. Despite its clear relevance as a social be
Leippe et al. (Thu,) studied this question.