Doing Diplomatic History by the Numbers

Schroeder's thoughtful critique of the Situational Analysis Project (SAP) is a welcome and, in many ways, unique addition to the debate over the applicability of quantitative methods to diplomatic history. As far as I know, it represents the first serious discussion by a traditional diplomatic historian of the ways in which quantifiers from across the disciplinary boundary have been ravishing Clio. My only regret is that this thoughtful article is appearing in a journal which few historians read. Unfortunately, I must agree with Schroeder's contention that members of our guild have ignored work done in diplomatic history by behavioral scientists. Their disinterest in quantitative international politics has nothing to do with the relevance of such studies. In addition to the Correlates of War and Conflict and Integration projects cited by Schroeder, scores of comparable projects and publications should be of immediate interest to diplomatic historians.' And although it is true that some diplomatic historians are now beginning to take note of what the social sciences have to offer in the way of general models of decision making and bureaucratic politics, few have experimented with new methodologies. Perhaps I am being too harsh with my fellow diplomatic historians.