Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the "Iraqi Shock" on Japan

B EFORE the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, the Japanese government was cautious in adapting to power shifts in the international system during the late 1980s that were making Japan a major actor in the international system. The government's reluctance to carry out a more proactive style of diplomacy was understandable given that in emphasizing low (or the politics of a state), Japan was a major beneficiary of the former U.S. -led, cold war economic and security order.' In addition, a clear majority ofJapanese were opposed to a more active Japanese role in international security affairs. This was not only due to the prosperity a trading-state strategy had brought Japan, but also due to the legacy of World War II, which repudiated Japan's first attempt at finding a respected place in the world through force. On the one hand, the government was increasingly self-confident in light ofJapan's continuing large current account surpluses, its competitive edge in many industries, and opportunities presented by the end of East-West tensions. On the other hand, losses in manufacturing competitiveness and twin major deficits in government spending and trade by Japan's main trading partner and ally, the United States, worried the government in that it was thought that the U.S. might decline too quickly for any other nation to step in and fill the leadership void. Furthermore, the end of the cold war meant that theJapan-U.S. Security alliance, the principal framework by which Japan had integrated into international society and the U.S. -led international economic order, was declining in importance. To remedy this situation, Japan cautiously embarked on a post-cold war strategy of supporting a declining U.S. hegemon, through a gradual expansion of the Nichibei partnership into a global relationship, since no other country (includingJapan) was yet prepared to play the type of leadership