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This article investigates the reliability of the peer review of human rights judgments by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It argues that, even if composed of politically motivated actors, the Committee is not to be dismissed too cursorily as a deficient and unreliable system of compliance monitoring. Evidence shows that formal and informal institutional constraints, in particular the presence of a strong Secretariat, constrain the propensity to bargain amongst Council of Europe diplomats acting as peers when monitoring the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Our finding runs contrary to the proposition that Europe constitutes a special case of cultural convergence around respect for international human rights law. The article further argues that hybrid models of compliance monitoring which combine political as well as judicial and technocratic elements may be more effective in facilitating human rights compliance than direct international court orders or expert recommendations.
Çalı et al. (Tue,) studied this question.