Domestic ideas, institutions or interests? Explaining governmental preferences towards global economic governance

Controversies in global economic governance are strongly shaped by domestic societal forces. In some instances, however, governmental positions reflect domestic interests, while ideas influence positions in other instances. Under which conditions do ideas prevail over interests and vice versa? How do they interact with each other and with domestic institutions? I argue that governmental positions predominantly follow interests if the governance issue at stake impacts the cost–benefit calculations of specific sectors, while ideas dominate when sectoral interests are affected in a diffuse way and fundamental questions on the role of politics in steering the economy are at stake. Furthermore, governmental positions tend to be consistent with national institutions, when the global governance issue concerned refers to questions related to domestic patterns of socio-economic regulation. In enhancing the societal approach to international political economy (IPE), the article exemplifies the relevance of these arguments in case studies on the G20 and the International Monetary Fund.