Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant assigns origin as well as employment of regulative ideal of systematicity in empirical knowledge to of pure theoretical although, to be sure, to reason in its hypothetical rather than apodeictic employment (A 646-7/B 674-5).' In Critique ofJudgment, however, published only three years after revised second edition of Critique of Pure Reason, regulative ideal of systematicity is reassigned to newly introduced of Kant offers some explanation of what he means by judgment; but he does not mention that assignment of regulative ideal of systematicity to this new represents a revision of his previous view-indeed, he does not even mention that he had a previous view about systematicity. Commentators have generally followed Kant in passing over this revision in silence: even those with a special interest in topic of systematicity indiscriminately speak of it as a product of either reason or judgment.2 Yet surely Kant must have had some reason for making this change. What could it have been? Assuming that one knows what Kant means by reason, a natural place to begin consideration of this question is with his conception of reflective judgment. Kant describes in general as the of thinking particular as contained under (CJ, Introduction iv, 5:179) or faculty for subsumption of particular under (FI, section ii, 20:21). Any particular task of -subsumption, he then suggests, may take one of two forms: the universal (the rule, principle, law) may be given, in which case it is task of judgment to find a particular