Commentary: Social Institutions and Social Theory

two directions, of which the first is the lack of structural integration. The polar antithesis here is a state where individual norms have only random relations to each other where no normative system exists. It is easy to see that this implies the complete negation of institutional control. In the other direction the deviation is in terms of the breakdown of moral authority and its replacement by interest as a motive of conformity finally loss of control even by that means. In both cases the extreme polar antithesis to perfect integration will turn out to be Hobbes' state of nature, or Durkheim's anomie (they come down to the same thing) which, while it might well constitute an order in the functional, natural-science sense, is the complete negation of order in the normative, social, institutional sense. Naturally all concrete societies will fall somewhere between these two poles. Finally, beyond this analysis, the theory of institutions must be concerned with the dynamics of institutional change. The above considerations enable us to distinguish two fundamental sets of problems those connected with changes in the degree of effective enforcement, and those connected with structural change. The latter especially will be concerned with the processes by which existing value-systems change and new elements come in. This is the most formidable and difficult task of all, and hardly more than very highly tentative experimentation can be attempted by anyone considering the limitations of the current state of the literature of the subject. Before we get very far in developing a theory of change, it is necessary to know what it is that changes the principal task of this paper has been to supply that gap. It does not constitute a theory of social institutions rather some of the necessary prolegomena to such a theory.