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The capacity to shift experiential perspective-from within one's subjective experience onto that experience-is fundamental to being human. Scholars have long theorized that this metacognitive capacity-which we refer to as decentering-may play an important role in mental health. To help illuminate this mental phenomenon and its links to mental health, we critically examine decentering-related constructs and their respective literatures (e.g., self-distanced perspective, cognitive distancing, cognitive defusion). First, we introduce a novel metacognitive processes model of decentering. Specifically, we propose that, to varying degrees, decentering-related constructs reflect a common mental phenomenon subserved by three interrelated metacognitive processes: meta-awareness, disidentification from internal experience, and reduced reactivity to thought content. Second, we examine extant research linking decentering-related constructs and their underlying metacognitive processes to mental health. We conclude by proposing future directions for research that transcends decentering-related constructs in an effort to advance the field's understanding of this facet of human experience and its role in (mal)adaptation.
Bernstein et al. (Tue,) studied this question.