Crises and Crisis Generations: The Long-term Impact of International Crises on Military Political Participation

Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in government and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of acute international crises rather than its chronic threat environment. Poor outcomes—defeats or stalemates—in major international crises lead to professionalization and depoliticization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. A poor outcome creates pressure for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years later due to generational shifts. As officers of the “crisis generation” become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964–2008 and find strong support for it.