Measure of Social Danger of the Act as the Basis for Interbranch and Branch Differentiation of Legal Liability

The article notes the efficiency of philosophical approach to the determination of the basis of "interbranch differentiation of legal liability", since it involves the clarification of the basis (criteria) for the division of this liability into types.The main objectives of the study lie in clarifying the given ground and determining the difference of the latter and the basis of differentiation of criminal liability, the achievement of which is important for understanding the meaning of the provisions of the criminal law relating to the concept of crimes and their categorization as well as for assessing the quality of the regulation of the relevant legal instructions.The author substantiates the judgment about the impossibility of recognizing criterion for interbranch differentiation of legal liability of presence or absence of public danger in the act as it is inherent in all such offenses.At the same time the measure of the specified material property of the offense is noted.It is emphasized that "transformation" of a wrongdoing into a crime is conditioned by transition (jump) from one measure of social danger of an act to the other.The measure of social danger of an illegal act embodying qualitative and quantitative certainty of the class of offenses and should be recognized as a criterion for interbranch differentiation of legal liability.The paper also shows that in order to differentiate criminal liability it is already crucial to distinguish the extent of the social danger of the types of crimes, rather than the classes of offenses, the parameters of which the legislator calls the nature and degree of public danger.It is concluded that the lack of consensus in the theory of criminal law on the grounds for differentiation of legal liability at different levels of such division is due to some terminological uncertainty of legal provisions.