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Since the Chinese economic reform, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has gradually moved toward a separation of the party-state from society, manifested in the withdrawal of party power from many areas of society and the growing new power of private enterprises. The CPC has actively reformed itself as it has evolved from a revolutionary party into a governing party. The party’s support of and collaboration with private enterprises, a powerful and indispensable force in the Chinese economy, is a good example of such a change. Instead of focusing on political acceptance and organizational infiltration as most of the existing studies have done, this paper examines the political incorporation of the CPC’s integration policy towards private enterprises. Theoretical analysis, supported by case studies, indicates that the relationship between the ruling party and private businesses is not, contrary to common understanding, unidirectional absorption and penetration by the Party. Instead, it is an interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship. A further empirical examination of the Ninth National Survey of Private Enterprises confirms that private businesses that have set up CPC organizations or have owners who are themselves CPC members identify more strongly with the ruling party policies and are more active in production expansion and long-term growth. It appears that the CPC’s integration policy towards private enterprises has effectively utilized both ‘top-down’ organizational infiltration and ‘bottom-up’ political integration. In doing so, the CPC maintains its control over private enterprises. Not only does it consolidate the governing legitimacy of the Party, it also enables private businesses to fulfil its social function. The policy helps the Party successfully prevent the formation of non-institutionalized powers outside the system.
Ma et al. (Sun,) studied this question.