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Knowledge sharing behavior based on the cluster innovation network has become the primary measure for enterprises to realize sustainable innovation. In order to promote the proactive knowledge sharing behavior among enterprises in the long term, the dynamic evolutionary process and law of knowledge sharing in the network need to be further studied. As different from the hypothesis of the rational man in the classical game theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing behavior in the cluster innovation network based on the evolutionary game theory, and discusses how the bounded rational enterprises can achieve the evolutionary equilibrium through continuously adaptive learning and strategy optimization, further explores the influence factors on the evolutionary trajectory. Combined with mathematical derivation and simulation analysis, the following results are obtained: over time, the dynamic evolution of knowledge sharing behavior in the cluster innovation network is influenced by initial states of the system, but can always reach the evolutionary stable equilibrium; factors such as synergy revenue have a positive impact on the evolutionary results, while factors such as opportunity interest have a negative impact on the evolutionary results; the factor of revenue distribution has a U-shape relationship with the evolutionary results, and the factor of direct revenue has no effect on the results. The results are expected to have an implication for improving the sustainable innovation development of enterprises in the cluster innovation network.
Kong et al. (Fri,) studied this question.