Regime Type, Issue Type and Economic Sanctions: The Role of Domestic Players

This analysis highlights the significant role that domestic actors play in determining the outcomes of economic sanctions. It models the behavior of the main opposition party during an economic sanction episode, and introduces two commonly used variables when considering the effectiveness of economic sanctions—regime type and issue type—from a different perspective. Using Bayesian probabilities and a two-stage game-theoretic approach, the analysis finds that states are more likely to impose economic sanctions related to security issues rather than to nonsecurity issues. The tendency to impose sanctions to coerce action on security-related issues is higher when opposition parties in the sanctioning state object to the sanctions. The findings demonstrate that sanctions are more effective when they are supported by the opposition in sender states, as well as target states. Consistent with the literature, this analysis finds that sanctions are more effective when they are targeted against democracies. The game results indicate that sanctions are more successful when they relate to security issues. This paper supplies policymakers with a simple criterion for economic sanctions successs comprised of the support of the opposition within the sender state, that the issue should be of high stakes, and there is support for the economic sanctions from a viable opposition within the target state.