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Abstract The new public management combination of macro‐level fiscal targets and micro‐level restructuring can prompt enduring policy conflict. Via analysis of archival materials using the economies of worth framework, this case study of reform to New Zealand's Natural Disaster Fund identifies several reform design features that sustain policy conflict. Key among these is a governmental entity design structure that contains within the accounting boundary for whole of government, a further accounting boundary for determination of fiscal measures, and the imposition of antagonistic truces. Placement of some entities outside the boundary for fiscal measures but inside the whole of government boundary means fiscal measures may be improved by withholding or withdrawing funds from those entities. Antagonistic truces provide a means to continue these practices, at least temporarily. The findings extend understanding of the known tensions between individual entity accountability and whole of government accountability.
Susan Newberry (Tue,) studied this question.