Risk Aversion and Expected-utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem

USING EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY, economists model risk aversion as arising solely because the utility function over wealth is concave.This diminishing-marginal-utility-ofwealth theory of risk aversion is psychologically intuitive, and surely helps explain some of our aversion to large-scale risk: We dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable than a dollar that helps us become very rich.Yet this theory also implies that people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are small.Arrow (1971, p. 100) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function will always want to take a sufficiently small stake in any positiveexpected-value bet.That is, expected-utility maximizers are (almost everywhere) arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small.While most economists understand this formal limit result, fewer appreciate that the approximate risk-neutrality prediction holds not just for negligible stakes, but for quite sizable and economically important stakes.Economists often invoke expected-utility theory to explain substantial (observed or posited) risk aversion over stakes where the theory actually predicts virtual risk neutrality.While not broadly appreciated, the inability of expected-utility theory to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over modest stakes has become oral tradition among some subsets of researchers, and has been illustrated in writing in a variety of different contexts using standard utility functions.2In this paper, I reinforce this previous research by presenting a theorem that calibrates a relationship between risk attitudes over small and large stakes.The theorem shows that, within the expected-utility model, anything but virtual risk neutrality over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over 1 Many people, including