What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”?

The ability to be treated equally as a knower has in recent years become increasingly recognized as an important aspect of justice within social and political philosophy. Unfair and unjust communicative structures, institutions, and practices have the potential to reproduce and further exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities and injustices. Epistemic injustice is the idea that we can be unfairly discriminated against in our capacity as a knower based on prejudices about the speaker, such as gender, social background, ethnicity, race, sexuality, tone of voice, accent, and so on. The concept of epistemic injustice has fostered a large body of literature in recent years, which seeks to clarify the concept and apply it to practical cases. Yet, the literature on epistemic injustice has mainly focused on what makes an epistemic injustice epistemic—as opposed to distributive or socioeconomic—and little attention has been paid to what exactly makes an epistemic injustice an injustice. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna by asking under what conditions epistemic discrimination suffered by a knower becomes an epistemic injustice. In particular, I argue that we can identify five conditions that make an epistemic injustice an injustice. While the first two conditions—the disadvantage condition and the prejudice condition—are derived from Fricker's (2007) arguments, I identify three additional conditions—the stakeholder condition, the epistemic condition, and the social justice condition—the violation of which create an epistemic injustice. The paper thus contributes to the literature on epistemic injustice by clarifying and extending existing work on epistemic injustice to identify a set of conditions through which it is possible to eliminate cases of epistemic disadvantage that are not unjust and make it easier to systematically identify and evaluate claims of epistemic injustice. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide a short introduction to the concept of “epistemic injustice,” why it is an important aspect of justice, and how it adversely affects those who are subject to it. In Section 3, I further identify, analyze, and discuss two conditions of epistemic injustice in Fricker (2007)—the disadvantage condition and the prejudice condition. In Section 4, I present three additional conditions that make an epistemic injustice an injustice, namely the stakeholder condition, the epistemic condition, and the social justice condition. In Section 5, I discuss how the five conditions can be employed in practice to identify and evaluate claims of epistemic injustice. What is epistemic injustice and why is in an important concept to investigate within moral, social, and political philosophy? According to Fricker (2007, 1), epistemic injustice is a “distinctively epistemic kind of injustice,” in which someone is wronged “specifically in their capacity as a knower.” Fricker argues that there are two distinct forms of epistemic injustice, namely testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In the first case, testimonial injustice occurs when we attribute more or less credibility to a statement based on prejudices about the speaker, such as gender, social background, ethnicity, race, sexuality, tone of voice, accent, and so on (Fricker 2007, 1, section 1.3). Testimonial injustices wrong someone in their capacity as a speaker or knower because the increased or decreased credibility accorded to their testimony is based not on any relevant concerns, but on prejudices that have nothing to do with whether the speaker or knower should be granted credibility. This in turn gives an unfair advantage in communicating their knowledge to those who are not subject to these prejudices. Crucially, testimonial injustice may lead to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007, 162). That is, when testimonial injustices structurally affect what is included in a collective pool of knowledge it leads to an underrepresentation of the experiences of marginalized individuals and groups, in turn affecting their ability to make sense of their experiences.1 1 Consider, example, how the rise of psychological, sociological, and biological studies of sexuality since the 18th Century made sexuality into an object of knowledge, which in turn allowed those who control this knowledge––in particular, scientists, and government officials––a greater ability to control the discourse on sexuality and, especially, the concepts we are able to use to define our own sexuality, such as labeling sex outside of marriage a “perversion” and female sexuality “hysteria” (Foucault 1978). The lack of such conceptual framework to make sense of one's experiences is an injustice, according to Fricker (2007, 147), because it unfairly advantages those who are able to have their experiences represented in the collective body of knowledge to be able to successfully communicate their experiences to other people: “the powerful have an unfair advantage in structuring collective social understandings.” So far, within the normative philosophical literature, the focus has been on how to situate epistemic injustice within philosophical disciplines, such as distributive justice (Coady 2017) or feminist philosophy (Medina 2013), or how to apply the concept in practice, for example within health care (Carel and Kidd 2014; 2017) or law (Sullivan 2017). Moreover, while the concept of epistemic injustice has received considerable attention within epistemology in recent years, this has mostly concerned the question of how to delimit when someone is justified in discriminating against someone and what makes it an epistemic injustice in the first place.2 2 For a discussion on epistemic injustice from an epistemological perspective, see Alcoff (2010), Coady (2010), Fricker (2010), Goldberg (2010), Hookway (2010), Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus (2017), Maitra (2010), and Pohlhaus (2012; 2014). For some examples of practical applications of the concept of epistemic injustice, see Alfano and Skorburg (2018), Carel and Kidd (2014), Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus (2017, part 5), Medina (2013), and Tsosie (2012). Contributing to, building and extending this important literature, in the of this paper I the more what makes an epistemic injustice an In particular, I identify and on a set of five conditions for epistemic injustice, which for the and of claims of epistemic injustice. 1 an and of the five conditions that I be in is it and to identify a set of conditions for epistemic The concept of epistemic injustice has the potential to and clarify of socioeconomic injustice and is thus an important concept not for and but for political since it the of the of institutions, such as as as by the conditions for epistemic injustice it is possible to systematically identify and evaluate claims of against or by individuals institutions, and how individuals and can epistemic and existing socioeconomic Epistemic disadvantage is for a of be wronged in one's capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity to is or wronged in a capacity to an (Fricker 2007, epistemic injustice a speaker or and (Fricker 2007, In the epistemic it the epistemic of social about how and practices of knowledge such as and institutions, unfairly some through and of and of their and and and of less powerful Medina, and Pohlhaus epistemic injustice to the epistemic of and socioeconomic injustices epistemic a large in who a in how to what socioeconomic those who are have a to their own in the and political the potential for the of the of and the underrepresentation of of to unfair and unjust communicative and have the potential to reproduce and further exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities and injustices. In in to apply the concept of epistemic injustice in practice to the of how social create and reproduce epistemic and we what exactly it is that makes an epistemic injustice an In the I first identify two conditions of epistemic injustice within Fricker's work I argue that we can identify three additional of epistemic injustice that can be within three additional conditions What conditions of epistemic injustice can be within Fricker's existing work on epistemic In this I argue that it is possible to identify two conditions of epistemic injustice within Fricker's epistemic injustice is unjust according to I because it leads to epistemic and socioeconomic and inequalities disadvantage based on about the speaker prejudice be Fricker not what the conditions of epistemic injustice that these two are the that an epistemic injustice as an injustice. the two conditions are based on own of Fricker's Fricker not identify these two a part of conditions for epistemic injustice and the concept to clarify what makes an epistemic injustice an injustice according to Fricker and whether this cases of epistemic injustice. I argue that there are three additional of epistemic injustice not by the two conditions from Fricker's Fricker (2007, epistemic injustice is an injustice because it someone in their as a knower.” This Fricker is not a question of the of epistemic such as or which someone to make this the case, it be a of distributive injustice, according to epistemic injustice is to epistemic advantage (Fricker 2007, namely the to which a is able to successfully communicate their knowledge to and be by other What makes epistemic injustice an injustice, in this is that it someone in to their Fricker's first condition of epistemic injustice the disadvantage condition. in the Fricker (2007, argues that epistemic injustice and it the ability of someone to successfully make sense of and communicate their to less of a in the or epistemic injustice can further be to someone in that it may exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities and social and injustice (Fricker 2007, in disadvantage is to one's own epistemic and socioeconomic the epistemic discrimination in a less I and in to the epistemic and socioeconomic of other the epistemic discrimination in a less The disadvantage condition can be or In the first case, the epistemic discrimination the or For example, someone be by the to have testimony and (Fricker 2007, as the of injustice someone be by someone discriminated for example, be the of lack the to make sense of these experiences because the concept of is from the collective pool of knowledge to the of experiences of other of (Fricker 2007, 1, a is not discriminated against can be by the epistemic discrimination against other of Fricker (2007, argues that not cases of epistemic disadvantage are cases of epistemic injustice because may be for for example, so that it own credibility (Fricker 2007, or be so or about the subject that testimony can and should be as Fricker (2007, in credibility from that is and there are cases of epistemic disadvantage that are not epistemic injustices. Moreover, in some cases it is for epistemic injustice that it or That is, as Fricker it whether the disadvantage is about by a For example, as Fricker (2007, the hermeneutical disadvantage about by discrimination against the and the In the first case, the lack the concepts to make sense of in the case, the the concepts to that is as Fricker (2007, “the is not a to there is an sense in which it whether the disadvantage is not is the for the the as as but it is for the but not the In as I argue and on in to the social justice condition it whether someone is in an or Consider, for example, how philosophy to be by of a and we that of a are within the philosophical and that it not be an injustice their epistemic advantage be by to more and in philosophy. In we such to be part of any to and justice because and are and within the philosophical it is that the disadvantage condition is by a condition that the epistemic disadvantage or is about through unfair What makes it unjust to against a speaker, according to in which someone is unfairly discriminated against as a knower is the discrimination is based on prejudice (Fricker 2007, testimonial injustice, for example, occurs when a speaker is more or less credibility to a statement based on prejudices about such as gender, social background, ethnicity, race, sexuality, tone of voice, accent, and so on (Fricker 2007, 1, section 1.3). Fricker do not whether someone is a knower or not and should thus not the to which we attribute credibility to or In other an epistemic disadvantage is unfair because it is based on about the speaker that are for as a namely prejudices about this condition the prejudice condition. can be or or are about other and their that someone may it and 1, For example, how with are less to be for equally and may be prejudices are not to is an injustice. This is so in two Fricker (2007, that it should not be an injustice in cases the speaker is to a Consider, for example, cases the in the and as to work the of the speaker as because these are of (Fricker 2007, or the makes based on (Fricker 2007, are and (Fricker 2007, it is possible to prejudices about a speaker, with is, more credibility the speaker Consider, for example, how someone credibility to a speaker with an background, to the While this not the we be to this as an injustice since it not wrong or disadvantage the speaker in any sense (Fricker 2007, In the I argue that someone more epistemic credibility be unjust it or existing epistemic and socioeconomic inequalities and injustices. 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In particular, I argue that there are three additional to epistemic injustice and that these three additional conditions of epistemic injustice. The stakeholder condition that in for someone to be discriminated against as a be by the that are from The epistemic condition that the discriminated or of knowledge that is relevant for the that are the social justice condition that in for an epistemic discrimination or epistemic to be an epistemic injustice, the discriminated or the from other social injustices. Crucially, as with the two conditions in Fricker's I argue that condition is, in to an epistemic discrimination as an injustice. 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Moreover, someone from an epistemic injustice the epistemic condition how the discrimination of some testimonial leads to their experiences and knowledge from the collective pool of knowledge and how the some be and by the lack of to this For example, with discrimination be systematically within the collective pool of knowledge because of epistemic injustice that the epistemic The lack of to these have not discrimination the disadvantage condition the social justice the lack of knowledge of discrimination that be of unjust that and to socioeconomic lack the knowledge to identify, and these socioeconomic inequalities in an to Fricker (2007, and Coady epistemic injustice be from of socioeconomic and the social justice condition what makes epistemic injustice an injustice is to a large to and because such socioeconomic are in epistemic Epistemic and inequalities and social injustices are in two existing socioeconomic inequalities to a large epistemic Consider, for example, how can provide with and, more in how of may the credibility to of such as in the of to a (Fricker 2007, epistemic injustice may further and existing socioeconomic inequalities Medina, and Pohlhaus Consider, the of how lack of knowledge of discrimination against to further their In epistemic and socioeconomic are to other and it becomes to what this in epistemic injustices. we into these of and injustice, it becomes that not cases that are and to someone an epistemic injustice. 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This while is not within Fricker's own of epistemic injustice, which the of the social justice condition. the social justice condition is distinct from the prejudice condition. existing socioeconomic to of epistemic injustice. For the prejudice condition the of discriminating against a knower on the of in unjust such as and In other it to epistemic injustice cases the discrimination is by and cases discrimination is In the social justice condition to cases someone is discriminated or as set by the prejudice is in an and such as the in the and cases someone is in an and The of I have a greater injustice. how should this set of conditions be employed in practice to claims of epistemic In this I argue that the practical of the five conditions to make three of it is important to that of the five conditions is What this is that of the conditions to an aspect of epistemic injustice, in to an epistemic injustice in with a violation of of the other For example, as I have it not the of epistemic injustice to someone from a of which are epistemic this unfairly disadvantage have a stakeholder to in the stakeholder for violation of the stakeholder condition is to an epistemic injustice the epistemic condition is it a because the conditions are conditions of injustice, violation of condition by not an injustice. should the set of five conditions be as five conditions are has an epistemic injustice been but as a the violation of more conditions a greater injustice the violation of five conditions is a greater injustice the violation two Moreover, violation of some of the conditions is more because more of the unjust of epistemic injustice. 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The first two conditions in Fricker's work on epistemic injustice and that in for someone to be discriminated against as a epistemic socioeconomic and inequalities as a from the discrimination disadvantage and that the discrimination about the speaker prejudice I further that there are of epistemic injustice that are not by the disadvantage and prejudice conditions and that a further three conditions can be The stakeholder condition that in for someone to be discriminated against as a be by the that are from The epistemic condition that the discriminated or of knowledge that is relevant for the that are the social justice condition that in for an epistemic discrimination or epistemic to be an epistemic injustice, the discriminated or the from other social injustices. these five it is possible to systematically identify and evaluate claims of epistemic injustice and to claims of epistemic injustice that under we to I to and two for their on of this