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ABSTRACT We investigate Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) finding that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. If the relation between poor governance and poor returns is causal, we expect that the market is negatively surprised by the poor operating performance of weak governance firms. We find that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant operating underperformance. However, analysts' forecast errors and earnings announcement returns show no evidence that this underperformance surprises the market. Our results are robust to controls for takeover activity. Overall, our results do not support the hypothesis that weak governance causes poor stock returns.
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John E. Core
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Wayne R. Guay
University of Pennsylvania
Tjomme O. Rusticus
Hong Kong Polytechnic University
The Journal of Finance
University of Pennsylvania
California University of Pennsylvania
Moscow State University of Technologies and Management named after K.G. Razumovskiy
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Core et al. (Thu,) studied this question.
synapsesocial.com/papers/6a0e104732895a845a537084 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00851.x
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