The European Court of Human Rights—Can there be too much Success? A Comment

Abstract Like almost no other international human rights protection system, the system of the European Convention on Human Rights is institutionally consolidated. The present contribution briefly traces the genesis and development of the European Court of Human Rights and then turns to the examination of three challenges the Court is currently faced with. In the section on the lack of implementation of judgments, the approach of the German Federal Constitutional Court to the Strasbourg case law, which contrasts principled openness towards European human rights law with emphasizing constitutional identity, is analysed. Moreover, the contribution examines how this approach has been taken up by actors in the United Kingdom and Russia. The problem of the insufficient qualification of some candidates proposed by States is addressed in the section on the election of judges. A solution might be to formally integrate the members of the Advisory Panel into the official hearing of the candidates. The section on dynamic interpretation looks at the nexus between the Court’s interpretation of the Convention and the States’ acceptance of its jurisprudence. By transferring the interpretation of the Convention to an independent international authority, States relinquish part of their power. They will only accept this transfer of power permanently if the judicial interpretation by the Strasbourg Court remains consistent, comprehensible and plausible. The Court should therefore not act as a human rights’ ‘trendsetter’ or a ‘judicial activist’. Overall, three principles are decisive for an effective international human rights protection that meets with both the general and long-term acceptance on the part of the Contracting States and the undeniable needs of individuals to have their human rights and fundamental freedoms protected against unlawful State interference. These principles are the judicial self-restraint of the Court, the subsidiarity principle and a margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States.