Coordinated Charging and Discharging of Electric Vehicles: A New Class of Switching Attacks

In this work, we investigate that the abundance of Electric Vehicles (EVs) can be exploited to target the stability of the power grid. Through a cyber attack that compromises a lot of available EVs and their charging infrastructure, we present a realistic coordinated switching attack that initiates inter-area oscillations between different areas of the power grid. The threat model as well as linearized state-space representation of the grid are formulated to illustrate possible consequences of the attack. Two variations of switching attack are considered, namely, switching of EV charging and discharging power into the grid. Moreover, two possible attack strategies are also considered (i) using an insider to reveal the accurate system parameters and (ii) using reconnaissance activities in the absence of the grid parameters. In the former strategy, the system equations are used to compute the required knowledge to launch the attack. However, a stealthy system identification technique, which is tailored based on Eigenvalue Realization Algorithm (ERA), is proposed in latter strategy to calculate the required data for attack execution. The two-area Kundur, 39-Bus New England, and the Australian 5-area power grids are used to demonstrate the attack strategies and their consequences. The collected results demonstrate that by manipulation of EV charging stations and launching a coordinated switching attack to those portions of load, inter-area oscillations can be initiated. Finally, to protect the grid from this anticipated attack, a Support Vector Machine (SVM) based framework is proposed to detect and eliminate this attack even before being executed.